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1THE ARISTOCRATS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
HOW MODERN ENCLOSURE HAS FUELLED THE INTERNET PIRACY 
REVOLUTION
ABSTRACT
Modern intellectual property laws possess an unreasonably narrow focus on economic 
“incentivism” and pecuniary exploitation, which is problematic because it fails to address 
larger social welfare issues. This paper explores the genesis of two significant and 
chronologically overlapping legal evolutionary processes, that occurred in England during 
the 16th to 18th Century, to account for the development of this overly narrow economic 
focus. 
The first legal process would be the conception of intellectual property laws as a result of 
British guild influence during the industrial age. This has accounted for the asymmetrical 
development of intellectual property laws, which favour right-holder protectionism and seeks 
to combat the growing ease of copying that technology offers.
The second process is the medieval English “Enclosure Movement”, which academics use to 
draw similarities between the privatisation of common lands used by rural peasants and the 
contemporary propertisation of intellectual resource. The effect of intellectual propertisation 
grants right-holders exclusionary rights and contributes to the growing lack of access to 
intellectual goods by the masses.
Next, this essay explores the role that multinational conglomerates have played in fostering 
stronger global intellectual property rights and creating informational scarcity. 
Corporations do so through overzealous lobbying and unfortunately, the effects of which are 
not confined within a domestic level, and have an upward vertical transfer on an 
international level as well.
Lastly, the consequential effects of intellectual propertisation are explored through the use of 
several case studies. Firstly, in the case of the AIDS pandemic, the inflation of 
pharmaceutical drug prices have effectively deprived those afflicted from accessing the 
necessary medicines needed to alleviate pain and prolong life. Secondly, in the case of the 
informational commons of the Internet, continual Governmental attempts to regulate the 
Internet have instead conversely accounted for the proliferation of illegal file-sharing 
activities.
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3INTRODUCTION
The Present Conundrum
In the simplest of explanations, the term “intellectual property” encapsulates a product borne 
of an individual’s intellectual labour; the process of thought, imagination, invention and 
creation. The resultant expression or product of that intellectual pursuit, is then “enclosed” or 
“privatised” under copyright or patent law, made subject to the right of proprietary 
ownership. Along with that proprietary ownership is attached a bundle of auxiliary 
beneficiary and exclusionary rights.1 This grants the owner a duality of rights to not only 
exploit his intellectual work through its sale or rent, but at the same time it also affords him a 
discretionary power to control who may then have access to enjoy or use the said product.2
That definition, however, in reality is quite nebulous.3 As a result, the legal barriers set in 
place to safeguard a right-holder’s intellectual property have eroded to the point where an 
ordinary lay-person finds it hard to distinguish between lawful usage and infringement.4 
Contributing to this erosion is the surge in the number of technologically-savvy individuals 
who are emancipated from the inconvenience of the physical world of print and paper, but 
are instead well-versed in the ease of file-sharing that is associated with the virtual-plane of 
the Internet.5 The freedom, anonymity6 and neutrality7 associated with the Internet has thus 
allowed for the creation of an ill-conceived expectation (amongst modern consumers) that 
anything and everything freely downloadable from the Internet is in fact free.8  At a glance, 
who can blame them? Where the overpricing of books, movies, music and every other 
4
1 Severine Dusollier, “Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private 
Ordering” (2007) 82(3) Chicago-Kent Law Review 1391, 1391 - 2.
2 Adam B Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and its Discontents (Princeton Press, 2004) 4 - 
5.
3 Biogen Inc v Medeva PLC (1997) 114 RPC 1 (UK) per Lord Mustill.
4 Steven J Horowitz, “Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty” (2012) 79 University of 
Chicago Law Review 331, 333.
5 Adam D Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property (Dissertation, Ohio State 
University, 1997) ii.
6 Stefan Larsson and Mans Svensson, “Compliance or Obscurity? Online Anonymity as a 
Consequence of Fighting Unauthorised File Sharing” (2010) 2(4) Policy and Internet 77, 79 
- 80.
7 Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of The Commons in a Connected World 
(Random House Publishing, 2001) 36 - 7.
8 Ken Shao, Copyright Battles Shouldn’t be Fought for the Wrong Reasons (2011) Global 
Times China <http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/commentary/2011-05/655294.html> at 29 
August 2012.conceivable form of intellectual property is the norm in today’s society; it is no wonder that 
Internet pirates are being hailed by Internet “geeks” as cult-heroes, revolutionaries and 
virtual Robin Hoods fighting against greedy corporate overlords.9 
Mainstream intellectual property theory however persistently insists that the overpricing of 
intellectual goods are justified. On the basis that pecuniary reward is a necessary mechanism 
embedded within intellectual property rights to provide creators and authors with an 
incentive to continually create or innovate and that the element of incentivism is thus directly 
proportional to the effect of stimulus.10 Which is to say, the more financial gain afforded, the 
larger the impetus to create. This assumption conversely condemns piracy since legislation 
criminalises unauthorised copying and also undermines the future creative output of the 
creator due to his loss of financial gain. Yet, such an assumption is argued by dissenting 
academics to be inherently flawed when considering this simple scenario: are markets lost or 
is harm wrought onto the creator when an individual downloads a song that he never 
subjectively intended to purchase in the first instance?11
Setting aside the debate of whether online piracy is ever justified as a retaliatory response to 
the overpricing of digital content, consider instead whether the mainstream assumption about 
the current system of intellectual property is true. Especially with regard to the larger social 
implications that arise from the issue of global accessibility to medicine. The creation of 
pharmaceutical drugs is undeniably seen as the noblest of human productions and yet it is 
neither freely accessible nor freely disseminated. Medication is priced expensively, and is 
overzealously coveted and protected by large pharmaceutical corporations for the sake of 
economic exploitation. In that regard, should civil disobedience be favoured instead as a 
revolutionary response; where the illicit reproduction of generic drugs actually affords 
society more boon then it does bane?
The crux of this contemporary conundrum is therefore as Jeremy Waldron astutely observed; 
simply a matter of perspective. The line between infringement and free enterprise is a fine 
one. Which is to say that if people respect a creator’s right to profit from his intellectual 
5
9 The Wall Street Journal, Pirate Bay: Heroes or Criminals? (2009) <http://blogs.wsj.com/
digits/2009/04/13/pirate-bay-heroes-or-criminals/> at 7 September 2012.
10 Nicholas P Suzor, “Access, Progress, and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in 
Copyright” (2012) 15 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 1, 1.
11 Stuart P Green, When Stealing Isn’t Stealing (2012) The New York Times <http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/theft-law-in-the-21st-century.html?
_r=2&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1333108962-MMcE/mz1IjRA34OYsq88Ag#> 
at 29 September 2012.endeavours, then the copier is perceived as nothing more than a thief. If, however, the 
perspective is inverted; where the author is seen as nothing more than a statutory monopoly, 
then copying is justified since the copier merely epitomises the ideals of free enterprise.12
This paper argues that the contemporary conundrum posited above is a result of the historical 
development of intellectual property laws, which has been moulded over time through the 
influence of corporate entities. This paper further explores the detrimental effect that the 
incremental strengthening of intellectual property laws has had on consumers. And explains 
how the marginalisation of consumers has attributed to the proliferation of piracy as a natural 
counter-intuitive response towards promoting freedom of access to informational and 
intellectual goods. 
First, Part I of this paper explores the historical creation of intellectual property laws, which 
emerged as a result of the influence British guilds had over the Monarchy during the 16th 
Century. This proves that from the initial creation of intellectual property laws, social 
welfare and the ideals of free dissemination of knowledge was of little importance to 
medieval legislators. This is further contrasted against the modern economic justifications 
that proponents of intellectual property rights adopt in their bid to promote the strengthening 
of pre-existing intellectual property rights. Second, Part II then discusses the chronologically 
overlapping legal formative process of the medieval British “enclosure movement”. And 
further discusses how the British nobility strove to deprive peasants of common lands and 
defended their actions by citing the inevitable tragedy of resource overuse if the commons 
were allowed to persist. Third, Part III then compares the similarities and dissimilarities that 
modern interpretations of intellectual enclosure had to its medieval predecessor. And also 
raises the pertinent issue of who the aristocrats are in today’s modern context so as to 
adequately identify the rationale behind the need for stronger intellectual property rights. 
And finally, Part IV of this paper focuses specifically on the modern debate surrounding the 
Internet. Exploring not only the need for fairer-pricing of digital content but also the 
relaxation of restrictive interference from private and public bodies alike. This is because 
tighter regulatory control in reality propagates more instances and sophisticated methods of 
piracy. Lastly, this essay also considers examples of revolutionary market practices which 
could quell consumer dissatisfaction; by allowing increased affordability and accessibility of 
intellectual and informational goods for the masses.
6
12 Jeremy Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in 
Intellectual Property” (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 842, 842 - 3.PART I - THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
1. A Brief History of the Anglo-American Model of Intellectual Property Law
In tracing the genealogy of intellectual property rights back to its roots, it would prove futile 
to identify a singular source of origination since such rights developed separately and 
independently as a result of geographical and ideological differences.13 However, the most 
readily recognisable instance of creation would be that of the British model of intellectual 
property rights, which arose in response to the emergence of guild monopolies and the later 
industrialisation of mechanised commercial printing and manufacturing from the 16th to 18th 
Century.14
The significance of British guild influence on the creation of intellectual property laws can 
be attributed to the high revenue taxes and licensing fees paid to the Monarchy. Any 
disruption to a guild’s business through the illegitimate replication of their intellectual 
property thus meant a disruption in Crown payments. The threat posed by both the 
commercial printing press15 and mechanised manufacturing equipment, which allowed for 
the newfound ease by which counterfeiters could replicate literary works and products, was 
therefore a great cause for concern to the Monarchy. Causing the Monarchy to take 
responsive legal measures to protect its lucrative guild cash cows which allowed guilds to 
maintain proprietary control and exclusionary rights over their works and products.16
Further, during which time, Britain was in a state of fierce economic and technological 
competition, not only amongst its European neighbours but also with more technologically 
7
13 Ken Shao, “Monopoly or Reward? The Origin of Copyright and Authorship in England, 
France and China and a New Criticism of Intellectual Property” (2011) 41 Hong Kong Law 
Journal 731, 731 - 2. Dr. Shao’s investigation has revealed that besides the British guild and 
monopoly related origins of intellectual property laws, there too were independently 
emerging forms of copyrights and patent laws from France and China during the 16th 
Century. Both of which did not merely have a monopolistic agenda. In that regard, there are 
better theoretical bases than just monopoly to criticise the overprotection of intellectual 
property rights.
14 Ibid.
15 Paul Goldstein, Copyright, Patent, Trademark and Related State Doctrines: Cases and 
Materials on Intellectual Property Law (Foundation Press, revised 5th ed, 2005) 233 - 6.
16 Assafa Endeshaw, “Intellectual Property Enforcement in Asia: A Reality Check” (2005) 13 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 378, 378.advanced Asian civilisations (China and India).17 Intellectual property laws were enacted by 
Britain as a two-pronged approach towards becoming more competitive, and achieving 
dominance in the technological arena. First, copyright and patent laws were seen as means of 
preventing the transfer of knowledge through literature and the transfer of innovation 
through invention beyond its national border via illegal replication.18  Secondly, an ancillary 
purpose of intellectual property laws, as previously mentioned, was then to prevent the sale 
of illegally replicated products from disrupting the businesses operated by guilds within 
international markets. By doing so, the British were able to create trade exclusivity over its 
commodities and was consequently able to generate the requisite pulling impetus necessary 
to draw merchants to its shore.19 
The reformation of British immigration laws at that time will further prove how important 
the Monarchy viewed technological dominance. By offering attractive resettlement 
incentives, more favourable apprenticeship terms and cheaper rents for guilds. Further 
coupled with enforceable proprietary rights by inventors, the British were able to procure 
desirable technologies by inducing defection of the mobile skilled immigrants from its 
regional neighbours and colonies. The influx of skilled immigrants, brought with them 
valuable expertise in the fields of mining, metallurgy, tool making, building, chemistry and 
textile manufacturing. The combination of both aggressive immigration reforms and the 
effective implementation of intellectual property laws saw the rapid economic development 
and expansion of the British empire in comparison to that of their Asian20 competitors.21
An additional motive for the British Monarchy to enforce stricter intellectual property laws 
was for the purposes of censorship. For example, in 1557, the London Stationer’s Company 
was formed and sanctioned by the Crown. As a result of this royal patronage, the Crown 
maintained a veto right to ban or prohibit the dissemination of any literary works that were 
8
17 Stephan R Epstein, Transferring Technical Knowledge and Innovating in Europe, c.1200 – 
c.1800 (Workshop Paper, presented for LSE Research Online, 2005), 1.
18 Endeshaw, see note 14 above, 379.
19 Epstein, see note 17 above, 2.
20 For more information on why the British were able to overtake the Chinese’s innovative 
capacity see: Peter K Yu, “Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use 
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the US-China intellectual Property Debate” (2001) 19 Boston 
University International Law Journal 1, 24. In his paper, Yu states that the Chinese regarded 
foreigners with much skepticism and xenophobia and rejected King George III’s diplomatic 
efforts to establish an innovative and informational trade channel between the two nations 
during the Qing dynasty. This proud “nationalism” according to Yu has “brought China two 
centuries of tremendous pain and humiliation” in relation to their innovative capacity. 
21 Epstein, see note 17 above, 33.deemed to be morally abrasive, blasphemous or slanderous to the Monarchy (especially the 
ruling Royal family). This quid pro quo, between the British Crown and the guild, gave the 
guild exclusive monopoly over all printing and licensing rights for British literary works.22
The historical conception of intellectual property, in the context of the British model, was 
meant to be a self-serving form of protectionism aimed at furthering national economic 
interests by intentionally suppressing knowledge.23 The British model was therefore 
uninterested in the resultant long term side-effects that it would create in terms of stifling 
harmonious global development; or global social welfare; or knowledge dissemination and 
accessibility.24 Unfortunately however, the measure of success that the British intellectual 
property model offered, in terms of economic growth and development, was far too great for 
other emerging innovative markets to ignore. And in a bid to be equally competitive, 
America enacted its own intellectual property regimes, which in essence emulated and built 
upon the legacy of the British model25; granting right-holders exclusive proprietary 
ownership over any of its registered works/products while at the same time enforcing heavy 
penalties on infringers and allowing compensation for the wronged parties. The adoption of 
the British model has worked for the Americans and this has attributed to an indisputable 
technological frontier shift from the British to the Americans26, who in their own right have 
now become the leading technological powerhouse in today’s global innovation market.27 
But as a result of the adoption of the competitive British intellectual model, the 
contemporary Anglo-American intellectual property regime has also perpetuated the 
inherently selfish agendas and shortfalls of its predecessor.
9
22 Shao, see note 13 above, 11.
23 Endeshaw, see note 16 above, 378.
24 Joseph Gibbons Llewellyn and Xiao Li Wang, ‘Striking the “Rights” Balance Among 
Private Incentives and Public Fair Use in the United States and China (2008) 7 John 
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 488, 489.
25 John G Byrne, “Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An Overview of the 
Changes Required By GATT” (1995 – 1996) 34 Duquesne Law Review 120, 124.
26 Bruce Willis Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law (Public Affairs 
Press, 1967) 39.
27 Economist Intelligence Unit, A New Ranking of the World’s Most Innovative Countries 
(2009) <http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Cisco_Innovation_Complete.pdf> at 7 September 
2012.2. Justifications in Defence of Intellectual Property Laws
In spite of the seemingly selfish agendas behind the formation of intellectual property laws, 
there are also equally persuasive and logical justifications which support the existence of 
such laws. The first theoretical justification is derived from John Locke’s “Labour Theory”.28 
Locke’s labour theory stipulates that all men have a right to own the fruits of his labour, 
much like how a harvest belongs to a farmer, then so too should a book belong to an 
author.29 With that ownership, comes the natural assumption that the owner can then dispose 
of or alienate his property as he pleases and that includes the discretionary right to sell or bar 
usage to anyone so as to protect his own interests.
A novel justification of intellectual property laws can be found in Adam Moore’s 
contemporary interpretation of Locke’s natural rights theory.30 In his dissertation, Moore 
defends intellectual property on two fronts. The first being that intellectual resources are 
non-rivalrous31, which is to say that intellectual works can be created, possessed, owned and 
consumed by many individuals concurrently without injury. This goes towards satisfying 
Locke’s rule-utilitarian, which states that ownership over a previously un-owned object 
should be allowed where granting exclusive ownership causes no harm to any other through 
deprivation. Moore then argues that the frontier of intellectual pursuit is infinite given that an 
individual’s ability to create is independent and spontaneous. In quoting Locke: “nobody 
could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, 
who had a whole river of the same water left to quench his thirst…”.32 Moore stresses his 
point again; that intellectual property rights are justified at both the level of acts and at the 
level of institutions since it does not actually cause injury or deprivation to the consumer 
even though a right-holder has exclusive ownership over an intellectual good.33 
By way of a simple illustration, it can be argued that in the instance of the popular mobile 
telephone, no bane is created nor is prejudice caused through the exclusive ownership of 
patents associated with a mobile telephone. For example, in the ordinary lifespan of a 
10
28 John A Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton University Press, 1992) 1 – 12.
29 Madhavi Sunder, “Copyright, Culture, Copyright History: Introduction” (2011) 12 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law I, II.
30 Moore, see note 5 above.
31 Ibid, at iii.
32 Peter Laslett (ed), John Locke’s The Second Treatise of Government (New American 
Library, 1965) Chapter 5, para 33.
33  Moore, see note 5 above, 7 - 8.consumer, there is no expectation for the consumer to acquire the experiential skills or 
expend the effort necessary to invent a device that allows him to communicate wirelessly 
with another. In that regard, though the consumer might have to part with some of his own 
hard earned money, his life is still enriched by the convenience that comes with the purchase 
and subsequent usage of a mobile telephone. In fact, the convenience and enjoyment derived 
from the mobile telephone is directly consequential to the right-holder’s exclusive ownership 
of the intellectual property.
The next set of justifications are also derived from theoretical Lockean reasoning and is 
oriented more towards the economical aspect of intellectual property. This vein of Lockean 
reasoning suggests that property has a vital role in encouraging the expenditure of individual 
effort since disposal can be initiated with the remittance of money.34 The commodification, 
or the propertisation of any intellectual endeavour grants the owner the ability to charge 
another a pecuniary premium for the use of his property. This carries with it an element of 
incentivism, in the sense that an author or inventor may be motivated to create or innovate a 
commercially viable intellectual product, with the promise of financial reward through 
royalties.35 And after having gained financial success, the author or inventor would also be in 
a better position to fund further attempts at creating more intellectual goods. Intellectual 
property protection also gives an inventor or author the proper assurance that he will be 
given due recognition for his hard work as others are prevented from branding his protected 
property as their own or from making illicit replicates. Furthermore, this confidence to 
present a protected work to the public would also generate social progress and would in 
theory perpetuate creativity by inspiring others to invent and create.36
And lastly, as Douglas North suggests, the economic rationale of propertisation and the 
subsequent attachment of pecuniary value onto intellectual goods also provides a crucial 
impetus needed to drive global trade. What North means is that by attaching costs onto 
intellectual property, it promotes an efficient process of exchange and transference between 
the vendor and purchaser, since only those who can fully maximise the use of an intellectual 
good will invest the monies necessary to obtain it.37 This economic theory as propounded by 
11
34 Christopher May, “Unacceptable Costs: The Consequence of Making Knowledge Property 
in a Global Society” (2002) 16(2) Global Society 123, 125.
35 Ibid, 126.
36 Alfred Yen, “Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, The Intellectual Property and 
the Construction of Authorship” (1991 – 1992) 10 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law 
Journal 423, 424.
37 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge 
Press, 1990) 35. North further encourages market segregation and the discriminatory effect that the high 
pricing of intellectual property creates; by separating those who are both ill-equipped and 
inadequately financed from obtaining the intellectual goods. This according to North 
prevents wastage of intellectual resource and encourages innovation.38
3. The Theoretical Conflict: Criticisms of Intellectual Property Laws
Even with all the persuasive arguments for intellectual property laws, there are those who 
remain unconvinced that the propertisation of intellectual goods benefit human civilisation 
as a collective. One such criticism argues that commodification of the intellectual commons 
is perceived to cure an ailment which does not actually exist within the realm of creative 
thought.39 Proponents of intellectual property advocate the stimulating or catalytic effect 
financial incentivism has towards innovation, but evidence suggests otherwise.40 For 
example, prior to the creation of genetic patents over plant biology, there already existed a 
fertile breeding ground of innovative advances which was independently spurred by 
enthusiasts and husbandry societies in the absence of financial incentive.41 This exchange of 
ideas for the improvement of existing agricultural stock occurred through agricultural 
exhibitions, state county fairs, local newsletters and through the interaction of like-minded 
enthusiasts.42 Further empirical studies conducted by Moser also serves to rebut the viability 
of the incentive argument. Moser’s investigation revealed that the effect of patent systems 
did not evince a clear ability to raise the innovative potential of a nation; since there was 
little difference in terms of innovative activity between nations with patent laws and those 
12
38 North, see note 37 above, 34. This however contradicts with the notion that intellectual 
resources are in fact “non-rivalrous” and cannot therefore be subject to wastage or overuse, 
for more information on this debate, see page 27 below, at notes 131 and 132.
39 Michele Boldrin and David K Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly (Manuscript, 
Department of Economics University of Minnesota, 2005) Chapter 8, 4 - 5.
40  Ned Rossiter, “Creative Labour and the Role of Intellectual Property” (Report, for 
Monash University, 2004) 1, 6. According to Rossiter, when surveyed through his report, 
many commentators stated that income generated from their creative works was of very little 
importance especially those in the field of academic studies. And also, creative output was 
not the primary income of most, as such endeavors were pursued during “spare time” and 
was driven primarily by interest and passion.
41 J I Stallman, Impacts of the 1930 Plant Patent Act on Private Fruit Breeding Investment 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1986) 3 - 7.
42 H B Tuckey, “History of the American Pomological Society: History of Fruit Growing and 
Handling in the United States of America and Canada” (1976) American Pomological 
Society 1860, 1866.without such laws.43 Academics like Boldrin and Levine also warn against the use of 
incentivism as a driving impetus for innovation as it often replaces genuine innovational 
enthusiasm with an insatiable desire for pecuniary gain. It is this notion of capitalistic greed, 
according to them, that has accounted for the “exclusion of as many people as possible from 
fruitful intellectual intercourse”.44 The criticisms of intellectual property are directed at the 
duality of rights, both the inclusionary and exclusionary, that are inherently created at the 
time an intellectual good is commodified. By allowing the right-holder to reap financial 
reward, or as Runge and DeFranesco described as “being included in such a stream of 
[pecuniary] benefits”45, it creates an antagonistic relationship between the right-holder and 
every other individual. The resultant goal of the right-holder therefore is to maximally 
exercise his exclusionary rights; to selfishly safeguard his profit and prevent the outward 
leakage of any such profits.46
Besides criticisms made against the pragmatic aspects of economic incentivism, there are 
also those who criticise intellectual property’s theoretical justifications. Such dissidents, 
often referred to as control-critics47, such as James Boyle48 and Yochai Benkler49 argue that 
the increasing privatisation and control of intellectual property has accounted for the 
phenomena of “enclosure” and the continual disappearance of the “creative commons”. By 
legally providing right-holders with control over their intellectual property, it then in turn 
restricts freedom of access and reduces the availability of information. This reduction of 
critical creative inputs within the masses would then in turn stifle future creative output since 
new expressions of ideas are essentially a further development of existing well-known 
information.50 As succinctly put by Sir Issac Newton, “[we all] stand on the shoulders of 
13
43 Petra Moser, How do Patent Laws Influence Innovations? Evidence from Nineteenth-
Century World Fairs (Working Paper 9909, for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2003) 7 - 9.
44 Boldrin and Levine, see note 39 above, Chapter 8, 5.
45 C Ford Runge and Edi DeFrancesco, “Exclusion, Inclusion and Enclosure: Historical 
Commons and Modern Intellectual Property” (2006) 34 World Development 1713, 1714.
46 Adam Mossoff, “Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law” (2009) 22 Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology 321, 328 - 9.
47 Polk R Wagner, “Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies 
of Control” (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 995, 996.
48 James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain” (2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems Journal 33.
49 Yochai Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain” (1997) 74 New York University Law Review 354.
50 White v Samsung Electronics. America Inc. (1993) 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (United States 
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit) per Judge Kozinski’s dissenting judgement.giants”51, alluding to the dictum that all human brilliance is based off the efforts of our 
predecessors and without access to past works, future generations will experience a dearth of 
creativity.
Control-critics demand that intellectual goods be disassociated from real property rights, 
owing to the fact that both remain far too distinctive, in nature and subject matter, to be 
treated as equals. This notion, that “the rhetoric and economic theory of real property are 
increasingly dominating the discourse and conclusions in the very different world of 
intellectual property”52 has become a growing consensus amongst dissenting academics. One 
such dissenter, Christopher May further expands and exemplifies this growing consensus by 
raising two simple yet pertinent questions: (1) who ultimately benefits from the institutions 
of intellectual property and (2) what problems do they actually address or alleviate?53 By 
urging others to consider who the beneficiaries of intellectual property regimes are, May 
emphasises the growing asymmetry in the apportionment of rights between users and right-
holders, and also the excessive profiteering by intellectual property right-holders.
4. The Governmental Responses of Brazil, South Africa and the International Community: A 
Case Study of the AIDS Pandemic
In considering the two questions raised above, May uses the case study of the global AIDS 
pandemic to further drive home the problems that plague intellectual property -  at a 
macrocosmic level, when used to address global social issues, the economic justifications of 
intellectual property fails miserably. Since, firstly, intellectual property serves only its 
master; right-holders, which are often large corporations driven by economic incentive.54 
Secondly, intellectual property does little to address social health issues nor does it allow for 
increased accessibility of protected goods, since such notions are adverse to the corporation’s 
own profit-oriented interests.55 Even in relation to AIDS medication there is no exception, 
and it is priced by large pharmaceutical corporations to allow for maximum generation of 
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55 May, see note 34 above, 127 - 8.profit.56 This over-pricing accounts for the high annual expenditure for an individual 
suffering from AIDS, which is estimated to be 10,000 times higher than the average per 
capita health related expenditure of many developing states.57 The effect of which places the 
cocktail of pharmaceutical drugs, necessary for the alleviation, suppression and treatment of 
AIDS, far beyond the financial reach of sorry plight nations such as Ghana, Brazil and South 
Africa.
As indicative from a survey conducted by UNAIDS in 2002, it is estimated that out of a total 
of 40 million people infected with the HIV virus living in developing nations, a resounding 
90% (36 million) have no access to the cocktail of anti-retroviral drugs needed to prolong 
their lives.58 This lack of access is thus the primary cause for the death of millions of the 
poor afflicted with HIV each year.59  In a desperate bid to gain access to the necessary 
medicines, the above mentioned nations sought to import generic versions of the medication 
from India (which was producing generic AIDS medication in direct contravention of its 
own TRIPS60 Agreement provisions). This prompted several pharmaceutical companies to 
reduce prices61, but not significantly enough to allow for affordability.62 In the case of Brazil, 
legal action was commenced by America (on the urging of Merck - a pharmaceutical 
corporation63) at the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) to prevent the use of counterfeit 
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63 Frederick M Abbott, “Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit” (2009) 1 World 
Intellectual Property Organisation Journal 43, 47. According to Abbott, there were other 
ways in which Merck tried to prevent Brazil from receiving other needed medicines as well. 
For example, Merck asserted pressure on the Netherlands government (in which country 
Merck held patent rights) in order to seize a generic form of Losartan (a type of medication 
used to treat high blood pressure), in transit from India to Brazil.medications protected under American intellectual property laws.64 This apathetic act by the 
Americans could only be seen to be encouraged by the pharmaceutical right-holders and 
caused sceptics to question the antagonistic ulterior motives of the American legislators and 
governments which, in this case, clearly favoured the enforcement of the owner’s rights over 
the lives of those who could have been saved if only they were granted access to the 
medication.65
Brazil’s Response: The response adopted by the Brazilian government in retaliation against 
Merck’s apparent legal actions has been praised by the international community and Brazil 
has now become a paragon for developing nations leading the fight against large 
pharmaceutical corporations.66 Shortly after the commencement of the legal action Brazil 
responded by threatening pharmaceutical companies within its borders that it would be 
imposing compulsory licensing.67 The implementation of such intellectual property reforms 
would in effect allow the Brazilian government to make use of the patents protected so 
dearly by the pharmaceutical companies without requiring their consent. And this 
compulsory license would further allow limitless reproduction of the said protected 
medicines, all for a fixed nominal fee and without any subsequent payments of royalties.68 
This threat alone, as noted by Pedro Roffe, was sufficient for the large pharmaceutical 
corporations to withdraw any legal action and to “reduce the price of individual HIV/AIDs 
retroviral drugs by up to 75 per cent”.69 Though other nations have tried to emulate Brazil’s 
actions, by threatening to similarly impose compulsory licensing, there are conditions unique 
to Brazil which allowed it to achieve the level of success that it did. Firstly, Brazil had at that 
time, already established a sophisticated indigenous pharmaceutical manufacturing sector 
and had the means to execute its threat.70 The second condition was that Brazil’s population, 
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Law 21, 44.unlike other developing nations, comprised of a large affluent middle-class market which 
many pharmaceutical corporations could not afford to alienate. The combination of these two 
factors thus heightened Brazil’s bargaining position and allowed them to effectively counter 
their pharmaceutical bullies.71 
South Africa’s response: In March 2001, South Africa commenced legal action against a 39-
corporation alliance to challenge the justification of intellectual property protection over 
AIDS medication and the legality of abrogating those rights in light of its nation’s dire 
healthcare crisis.72 At trial, the alliance sought to defend its own rights by leading a primary 
argument of remuneration, which is to say that the high-pricing of the drugs were necessary 
and justified as it was to recoup the costs associated with the development of the drugs. The 
next argument raised by the alliance was that the revenue generated from the sale of the 
medication had a secondary purpose, which was incentivism. The alliance thus alleged that 
by undermining a pharmaceutical corporation's ability to reap economic reward there would 
be a drastic decline in subsequent medical research.73 However, as noted by Sarah Boseley, 
these arguments were a fallacy since evidence suggested that the drugs developed for AIDS 
treatment was heavily reliant on public funding and charitable contributions.74 
Pharmaceutical companies, even in the wake of such revelation, have neither compromised 
nor budged, and the price of AIDS medication still remains high and access remains 
restricted to those who cannot afford it. Yet the demand for such expensive medication has 
not fallen in the least, owing to campaigning by such pharmaceutical companies, which 
claim that generic drugs lack the stringent quality-control systems of its more expensive 
counterparts and as a result offer less definitive results.75 And this fuels the superstitious 
belief that the “more expensive product, will usually deliver better results”, and when it 
comes to a matter of life and death, few are willing to opt for the purportedly inferior 
product.
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PharmacoEconomics 293, 299.International Response: Following the two case studies discussed above, the international 
community was finally urged76 at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong to address 
the issue of the public health crises in less developed countries.77 At the Ministerial 
Conference, it was decided that the TRIPS agreement would be amended to allow signatories 
with insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities to import generic versions of 
medications.78 However many criticised this unprecedented amendment as being brought 
about by developed nations for their own benefit. This was attributed to the fact that 
developed nations were also experiencing growing problems associated with the access to 
medicines.79 These concerns were brought about due to the demographic concentration of 
aging citizens within a developed nation and as such would pose an increasing strain on state 
healthcare budgeting.80 Further, these concerns were exacerbated by the alarming increased 
instances of the global transmission of deadly flu strains such as Swine flu, Avian flu and 
SARS.81 An academic in this new frontier, Peter Yu has remarked that if it were not for the 
added impetus from developed nations, the issue of access-to-medicines in developing 
nations might very well have gone unresolved.82
This global consciousness shift, regardless of its underlying motivation never-the-less now 
recognised the need for cheaper forms of pharmaceutical manufacturing such as the 
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instance of a global pandemic.inclusion of generic forms of medication. Many market analysts predicted that 
pharmaceutical corporations would reduce prices further to remain competitive given the 
newfound surge of cheaper generic alternatives. However, contrary to these predictions, 
pharmaceutical companies, as before, remain undeterred. As noted by Barbara Rosenberg, 
pharmaceutical corporations then commenced a strategic and covert series of operations to 
prolong its own market exclusivity and undermine the functionality of generic drug 
manufacturers. First, pharmaceutical companies commenced legal actions against generic 
drug manufacturers in order to increase the costs of generics entering the market. Secondly, 
pharmaceutical corporations modified drug molecules or recombined existing drugs, in 
minimally different ways, for which new patents could be sought to gain an extension of its 
term of intellectual property protection. Thirdly, pharmaceutical corporations rushed to 
trademark brand names, before generic drug manufacturers, in a bid to erect more barriers 
prior to the entry of the generic drug into the market.83
The blatant refusal by pharmaceutical corporations to reduce prices even in the face of social 
injustice is clearly an indication of their insatiable desire for financial reward and 
indifference towards larger social concerns. The reasons for this refusal is observed by Keith 
Maskus through two key economical factors. First, pharmaceutical corporations fear that by 
granting concessions to developing nations, it would undermine their ability to maintain high 
prices in the markets of developed nations.84 The effect of granting concessions would reveal 
the marginal costs of their drug production capabilities. As such pharmaceutical corporations 
would face mounting pressures in developed markets for lower prices, especially for the 
supply of medicines to lower-income households. Secondly, pharmaceutical corporations and 
distributors experience greater profitability in selling low volumes of drugs at high prices 
rather than higher volumes at lower prices. This is due to the elimination of external costs 
associated with the transportation of large volumes of stock.85 Lastly, for pharmaceutical 
corporations waging legal war against their generic-drug-manufacturing rivals, it is merely a 
waiting game. As Timmermans predicts, the grace-period which allows less developed 
nations to import generic drugs will expire in 2016. At which time the generic drug market is 
doomed to collapse owing to the lack of market demand.86
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1. The Enclosure Movement in Medieval England
Between the 17th and 19th Century (coinciding with the intellectual property law boom and 
the Industrial Revolution) there too was another formative legal evolutionary process taking 
place in England, known simply as “Enclosure”. Though the term has become synonymous 
with the physical act of fencing off the perimeter of a plot of land, its historical significance 
cannot however be understated since it has accounted for the modern day understanding of 
the term “private property”. The enclosure movement has thus become critical in the 
formation of every individual’s basal right to own, enjoy and freely use the land subject to 
his ownership; free from the interference and intrusion of others.87 In the legal sense of the 
term, it meant that a designated plot of land was to be converted into “severalty”, and the 
lawful owner was granted title over that plot. The land was thus severed from any communal 
rights of ownership or control by the public at large. The legal definition differs from the 
conventional dictionary meaning of the term “enclosure”, in that an unfenced piece of land 
could still be held in severalty and a person who crosses the invisible threshold without 
permission can still be found guilty of trespass. While conversely, a fenced off area might 
still be a part of the public commons; free for all to enjoy.88
The motives behind the formation of enclosuristic laws in relation to land rights, like those 
of intellectual property, are said to originate from selfish and protectionist ideals.89 Jeanette 
Neeson, for example argues that the enclosure movement was a result of upper-class 
lobbyists, comprising of nobles and aristocrats, who were already entrenched in influential 
positions within the ruling British Government or Monarchy. These nobles did so to alter the 
social structure of rural England, which was predominantly common land left for the usage 
of commoners.90 The commoners, under the quasi-feudal system of the English Monarchy, 
held proprietary interest over common land through customary rights owing to the fact that 
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transferrable through familial inheritance.
The nobles, of that time, viewed commoners as a race all unto their own and regarded 
commoners with a great deal of racist, xenophobic and instinctive distrust.92 Furthermore, 
due to the profound social, economic and educative divide, commoners were often described 
by the nobles as wild, morally apathetic, lazy and barbaric.93 Nobles also viewed the notion 
of land-sharing as primitive and economically unviable, since valuable arable land was left 
untilled and unexploited, and was instead occupied by homeless squatters or used by 
nomadic farmers for livestock grazing, as was their right to do so under customary law at the 
time.94 To better portray the resentment that the nobles had towards commoners, a quote 
from the then President of the Board of Agriculture, Sir John Sinclair, is most apt at 
illustrating such sentiment: “Why should we not attempt a [military] campaign also against 
our great domestic foe... let us subdue Finchley Common; let us conquer Hounslow Heath; 
let us compel Epping Forest to submit to the yoke of improvement”.95 The extent of the 
hatred towards commoners, as articulated by Sir John, did not stop short of the annihilation 
of the commoners by military genocide and it was this fervent disdain for commoners that 
the nobles lobbied the English Parliament to have those common rights extinguished. The 
result of this lobbying was famously described by E. P. Thompson in his dismissal of the 
enclosure movement, as nothing more than a “plain enough case of class robbery”.96
Thompson explains that the tainted bias amongst nobles towards the commoners were 
unwieldy, and in reality a large proportion of common land was engaged in more than just 
low-yield subsistence farming. Squatters, who were thought to be incorrigible and ill-
disciplined, had both sophisticated domestic and intra-village markets, trade channels and 
had even built permanent dwellings out of stone and mortar, rather than tarps and twigs.97 
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97 M Weekly (ed),  Memoirs of Thomas Bewick (Cresset, 1961) 27.And yet, the purpose of enforcing enclosuristic laws was to simply deny the commoner use 
of the land; as any occupier who was unable to establish a claim over the land or produce a 
valid title was evicted swiftly and without compensation. While even those who had a valid 
right to remain were relegated to infertile terrain, unfit for subsistence, and were still 
apportioned high rental fees for tenancy. 98
An example in demonstrating the inequality of land distribution and rent apportionment is 
evinced from the commons of Barton-on-Humber at the time of conversion into severalty. Of 
the total 6,000 acres available, 81% of the total land area (4860 acres) was owned by just 10 
aristocrats, while the remaining 19% (1140 acres) was allotted to and divided amongst 116 
commoners. Furthermore the average rental value of the enclosed arable land tripled from 6 
shillings 6 pence to 20 shillings an acre.99 By privatising the commons, the nobles effectively 
caused the redistribution of income from the commons back onto themselves by creating a 
dizzying upward spiral of increased land and food prices.100 Firstly, because land became 
more scarce, competition amongst tenants drove land prices to become unreasonably high. 
Secondly, by depriving the commoners of land used for gathering, grazing and subsistence 
farming, it also created a secondary scarcity of food which in turn caused the higher demand 
for agricultural commodities to exponentially increase arable land values as well.101 
The arrogance of the rich aristocracy towards the commoners however left them blinded to 
the adverse effects enclosure would have on the spatial displacement of the rural population. 
By making rental practically unaffordable and thereby forcing commoners out of their land, 
lawmakers neither accounted for nor foresaw the backlash effects. Such as the sudden 
desertion of the periphery and the subsequent polarisation of ex-field-labourers within the 
urban city-centre in search of housing and income.102 And much to the regret of landowners 
and aristocrats alike, this sudden influx of people into London accounted for over-
population, appalling hygiene, epidemic, increased waste and pollution. In their paper, 
Runge and DeFrancesco found a correlation between the outbreak of the Black Death (the 
Great Plague of London from 1665 - 1666) and enclosure, which occurred at the peak of 
British enclosure; at a time when enclosure accounted for about a third of England’s total 
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102 Thompson, see note 96 above, 223.land mass.103 The nobles also experienced increased poor-dependency through 
“bounties” (derived from the old English word “boon-ity” – much like modern day welfare 
grants for the unemployed) established by the Poor Law Commission in the aid of the 
commoners.104
However, there are still those that argue that privatisation was necessary to avert Hardin's 
proposed “tragedy of the commons”. Hardin’s tragedy predicted social disintegration due to 
increased competition for the use of common land105 and environmental degradation due to 
fierce over-exploitation owing to the fact that each herdsman will try to rear as much cattle 
as possible on the commons.106 Defenders of enclosure also argue that by granting ownership 
of arable agricultural land to wealthy and educated feudal lords, it prevented the land's 
overuse or underinvestment. It is these perceived (or misconceived) benefits which 
academics account for the resilience of the medieval English; being able to thrive despite 
constant warring and widespread epidemic at the close of the 16th Century.107 However, 
recent studies by Robert Allen question the true benefit that the enclosure movement actually 
produced.108 Allen dispels enclosure and instead argues that the marginalisation of the 
commoners through increased rents accounted for their diminished bargaining power and 
allowed the rich aristocratic landlords to amass more wealth. Allen again emphasises the fact 
that for the general masses, enclosure had little to no beneficial effect and merely 
redistributed any windfall to the already rich landowners.109
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Modern Interpretations of Enclosure
1. The Second Enclosure Movement
In retrospect, it is clear that the enclosure movement was unjust and had a particularly 
disastrous effect on a singular segment of society; evident in its causal role attributing to the 
social upheaval, geographic displacement, and the economic asymmetry between the 
aristocrats and the commoners in England.110 In comparison, there are uncanny similarities 
between the on-going propertisation of intellectual products and the medieval English 
enclosure of common land.111 In their fervent desire to achieve absolute control over their 
property, right-holders are unfairly marginalising consumers112, overcharging them for 
intellectual goods and unceremoniously forcing users out of the informational commons.113 
The resultant desertion of privatised land by the commoners due to exorbitant rent inflation 
is also echoed in the practice of modern-day consumers; which is to find cheaper alternatives 
to obtain intellectual products far beyond their financial means. And in this instance, 
consumers seek out cheaper and more readily accessible illicit counterfeits or pirated copies 
instead. The relevance of the study of the historical enclosure movement in today's global 
intellectual property climate should therefore serve as a cautionary tale for modern 
intellectual property policy-makers and the lobbyists who incite them; fixated in their 
relentless pursuit for the privatisation of intellectual goods that was once common property 
or entirely beyond any prior classification of property altogether.114 Despite the wealth of 
empirical evidence available against enclosure, there is still a failure to heed those warnings 
and a dearth of enlightenment in the approach taken by intellectual property proponents. 
In today’s context, the emergence of privatised informational goods and services as an 
unequivocally profitable market, brings us back again to yet another critical consideration 
for the use of economic incentivism and intellectual enclosure as a valid justification for 
defending intellectual property rights – is the enclosure of the intellectual commons more so 
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114 Boyle, see note 48 above, 34.justified because it has now become an important facet within the global economic market? 
Boyle’s answer to the fundamental query posed above is “no”, and he resolves it by again 
making a comparison between today’s enclosure movements and that of England’s historical 
enclosure. During the Napoleonic War (1803 – 1815), the English defended enclosure due to 
its effectiveness at driving agricultural yields up, not only to feed troops on the domestic 
front, but also to produce enough agricultural surplus to aid the war effort by generating 
revenue through surplus crop sales in a starved wartime economy.115 Boyle states that unlike 
crop production, informational output does not necessarily increase with stricter 
governmental regulation. Every increase of intellectual protection instead has the effect of 
erecting additional barriers affecting accessibility. This reduces the ability one has to access 
the intangible raw material needed for his or her own intellectual outputs.116 Thus according 
to Boyle, enclosing information from the public domain and subjecting it to exclusive 
control poses a detrimental to public welfare and social progress; in terms of the 
informational and educative enrichment of the masses. It is this argument that control-critics 
firmly stand behind and use to counter the push for stronger intellectual property rights and 
rebut any economical justifications put forward by lobbyists.117 
Sadly however, the current global climate of intellectual property is irrefutably driven by an 
element of profit. This global obsession with the economic importance of intellectual 
property is evident in this plain observation: among the world’s richest men are the co-
founders of the technological giant, Microsoft. For the past century, the world’s wealthiest 
people have always been associated with the physical resource of oil. The title of the 
“World’s Richest” began in the late nineteenth century with John D. Rockefeller and 
subsequently was subsumed by the Sultan of Brunei in the late twentieth century. Today 
however it is knowledge workers118 who rank at the top of the world’s rich lists: Bill Gates 
and Paul Allen with their combined wealth of USD$81.0 Billion.119 
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unsurprising that we now find ourselves in the midst of “the second wave of enclosure”.120 
A term coined by James Boyle to express the current “intellectual property land-grab”121, or 
“the enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind”122, where public fair use and private 
intellectual property rights are being reconfigured more and more in the favour of right-
holders.123 This continual enclosure of intellectual property is propelled by rich and highly 
influential corporations engaged in intellectual-property-intensive trade (such as 
informational, technological and pharmaceutical industries). Further, one must understand 
that as nations develop and reach maturity, its gross national product becomes increasingly 
reliant on value-added informational goods and services. There is therefore an inextricable 
connection between such corporations and its host nation; which have a vested interest in the 
successful enterprise of corporations reliant on its ability to exploit intellectual property 
without interference.124
2. The Dissimilarities between Real and Intellectual Enclosures
The phenomena of the inappropriate assignment of real proprietary rights onto intellectual 
goods, is said by Hannibal Travis, to have begun with Blackstonian reasoning.125 Blackstone 
was the foremost jurist that favoured perpetual common law copyright as proposed in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England.126 In it, Blackstone analogised and compared the 
exclusive rights over real property and that of intellectual property to a simple key. Akin to 
how a person may duplicate and distribute a set of keys to allow guests to enter his home, an 
author gives a publisher the right to make copies of his work, and yet the receiver is 
prohibited by a natural understanding that he may not then forge or sell the key for those 
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1769).uninvited.127 Blackstone further states that any attempt by another to take that work without 
authorisation will amount to an act of theft and an invasion of the right-holder's private 
property.128 Blackstone's definition, however, makes the assumption that all persons 
implicitly recognise a piece of intellectual work as being as intimate and private as that of a 
person's home. In reality however, the human psyche does not draw similarities between 
invasions of privacy and that of intellectual property infringement. Thus the legal barriers 
that are to be set in place, on a psychological level are ineffective due to the difference of 
perception between real property and intangible intellectual property.129
The dissimilarities between real property rights and those of intellectual property are not 
merely limited to the notion of personal privacy, but are in fact numerous and profound. By 
understanding these differences, it will further assist us in understanding whether the 
imposition of stronger intellectual property laws through enclosures are ever justified.130 
Firstly, and for proper clarification, the term “commons” encapsulates two very different 
subject matters, depending of course on its context. Though a commons in relation to land is 
straightforward, the latter intellectual commons is not so, as it refers to the intangible notion 
of ideas or creative thought, an ability shared by all humans collectively. Secondly, as 
mentioned before131, intellectual property is by its very medium and nature non-rivalrous, 
unlike common land usage that generally only supports one user and activity at a given time.  
For example digital format files can be accessed simultaneously, while any intangible 
thought can be had by any number of persons. Furthermore, Hardin's tragedy132 of 
aggressive competition can thus be easily avoided, as one would not have to worry about the 
overuse or sustainability of an intellectual commons as opposed to land, which can become 
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129 Tom R Tyler, “Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological 
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132 Hardin, see note 105 above for more information on Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons.barren from repeated use. The fact that an intellectual good is by nature and medium non-
rivalrous also poses a problem for right-holders enforcing their exclusionary rights. For 
example, a single digital file can be replicated an infinite number of times, and could 
therefore potentially satisfy an infinite number of consumers at virtually no cost.133 Which 
brings us to the third point, unlike common land, the intellectual commons is perceived to be 
non-exclusionary. This perception is further exacerbated and perpetuated by the advent of 
technology and the ease with which digital files can be uploaded, downloaded, printed, 
copied, pasted, converted, “burned”, saved and sent.
The fact that intellectual goods are non-rival and non-excludable has become the basal 
argument underlying the pro-intellectual property rights maxim employed by lobbyists. Such 
lobbyists argue that with every instance of cost depreciation in relation to the copying or 
transmission of informational goods, so too should the level of intellectual property 
protection increase in response. In that sense lobbyists argue that equilibrium must be 
maintained, and Boyle points out that this trend, to achieve absolute and perfect proprietary 
control over intellectual goods as copying costs approach a zero-minimum, has been clearly 
evident throughout the history of intellectual property.134 Tracing back to the roots of 
intellectual property history, Boyle has identified three milestones that have greatly reduced 
the exclusionary nature of informational goods and has also identified the corresponding 
regulatory response. (1) Physical copying gave rise to a need to control the tangible replica. 
(2) The Gutenberg printing press spawned the birth of intellectual property rights through the 
Statute of Anne.135 (3) While the Internet, and the perceived disastrous impact that it could 
have on informational goods, caused the United States to enact the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, the No Electronic Theft Act, the Sonny Bono Term Act and the Collections of 
Informational Anti-piracy Act.136 
All of the incremental legislative measures stated above serve to propertise and enclose 
intellectual goods in two main methods. Firstly, by extending the duration of protection 
(either over a patented process or a copyrighted work), the effect of which extends the 
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136 Boyle, see note 48 above, 42.exclusionary period the process or work has from becoming part of the public domain. The 
second method employed by existing right-holders/lobbyists would be to expand the actual 
scope or classification of intellectual property. This alters the requisite conditions necessary 
for a process or work to be eligible for protection, making it less onerous, and in effect 
means that more and more processes and works can be protected and excluded from the 
public domain.137
An example of modern enclosure through an extension of the scope of proprietary 
classification would be the broadening of patent rights to include human genetic material. 
Predictably, proponents for the enclosure of the human genome then chimed in unison that 
by doing so, it would guarantee investors the certainty of subsequent rights of exploitation. 
And owing to that certainty, it would allow for the inward flow of financial investment and 
lead to medical breakthroughs in the form of novel drug and gene therapies.138 In that sense, 
the appropriation of proprietary rights over genetic material would seem a noble endeavour, 
to spur medical progress and give due credit to the mantra that “property saves live”.139 
However, looking again at the case study of the AIDS pandemic. In relation to the field of 
medical development; initial innovate enthusiasm is often abrogated by capitalistic greed140, 
and the subsequent fruits of the medical research will be rendered unobtainable to those who 
need it most. Opponents also argue against the enclosure of the human genome on an ethical 
basis, claiming that all human genetic material forms a part of the collective heritage of 
humankind, and should by right remain common to all. The conversion of the human 
genome into intellectual property was thus seen as a gross invasion of individualism and 
privacy since it challenged the universal assumption that a person is master over himself and 
his body.141 This highlights another key difference between that of intellectual and real 
property, as intellectual property penetrates further into the realm of scientific human self-
discovery, it raises ethical issues that were never previously a cause of concern with 
inanimate real property. 
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41.3. Modern Aristocrats: Who Does the Enclosing?
In the modern context of intellectual enclosure, who are the aristocrats in today’s modern 
intellectual land grab? By resolving this query, it will allow for a better understanding of 
how these modern aristocrats’ agendas have shaped today’s intellectual property climate. As 
alluded previously, the creation and continued strengthening of intellectual property rights 
are predominantly driven by market concerns. Also, “intellectual property right-holders” are 
the main beneficiaries of intellectual property exploitation and therefore place express 
emphasis on the economic criteria and the remunerative nature of enclosure above any other 
concerns of public welfare or social progress.142 To reiterate, the “lobbyists” or “intellectual 
property proponents” of such market concerns are corporations that seek to commodify as 
much intellectual goods as possible.143 As Marian Miller observed, corporations are held 
accountable by shareholders to produce dividends, and it is this internal mechanism of 
capitalistic dynamism which fuels their insatiable drive to privatise informational resources, 
processes and markets.144 Enclosure, according to Miller, is a symptom caused by the 
deepening of corporate capitalism and its continual penetration into areas of daily life and 
social interactions, done so in the hopes of gaining a competitive edge in today’s competitive 
economic environment.145
Corporations, much like their medieval aristocratic counterparts employ similar tactics in 
achieving the propertisation of the informational commons. Corporations manipulate 
domestic governments to enact favourable local intellectual property laws by using their 
dominant bargaining position. A position which is as a result of a nation’s economic reliance 
on large corporations for investment, job creation and economic stimulation. This allows for 
a symbiotic relationship to be established between a corporation and its host nation146, and 
this relationship is based on the promissory trade-off that a host nation will do its utmost to 
legally protect and enforce the corporation’s intellectual property rights, so long as the 
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Global Virtue Ethics Review 51, 51 - 3.corporation passes on a significant amount of its financial benefit onto its host. In that sense 
developed nations are the next greatest stakeholders in the global technological and 
informational market and also stand to lose a great amount of revenue with the continual 
decline of transmission and copying costs.147 Though it is the national governments that are 
the ones who enact the laws which ultimately cause the enclosure of the informational 
commons, they do so at the behest, manipulation and even coercion of powerful 
conglomerates.148 This power, the ability to create and amend international intellectual 
property laws, has been said by independent academics like Vaitsos to have now shifted from 
once powerful state-authoritarian control to large multi-national corporations.149
Stephen Barley proffers that corporations manipulate the global politics of intellectual 
property because by their nature, corporations are abhorrent to change and are more inclined 
towards moulding their environments rather than being moulded by it.150 There are several 
key mechanisms which corporations utilise to mould their environments. First, corporations 
have strong public relations and advertising campaigns, which they use to legitimise their 
actions and gain public support. The second mechanism is “lobbying”, a term first used in 
England in the 17th Century to describe the process where non-members of the British 
government would argue their case in the “entry hall in the British House of Commons” (or 
the “lobby”).151 The modern expression of the term has essentially remained the same, 
except for the underlying implication of corruption that now permeates the term’s usage; 
stemming from the fact that it is now seen as the process for which money is exchanged for 
political favours.152
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formation of American Political Parties in 1824.At the forefront of such criticisms is America, which is said to be highly susceptible to 
manipulation by large corporations.153 The reason being that America is home to many 
technological, pharmaceutical and informational Goliaths, which also have far-reaching 
transnational affluence and clout. The influence of such corporations on American legislators 
and judges are evident from the trend of domestic reforms, which contributed to the upward 
strengthening of patent and copyright protection laws within America in the last two 
decades.154 The extent of the influence that corporations had on the American government 
was exemplified with the passing of the Tillman Act in 1907155, which was aimed at quelling 
public outrage over exorbitant “campaign contributions” which corporations poured into 
backing Presidential candidates. The cause for such public outrage stemmed from public 
sentiment, which reflected that this practice undermined the ideals of the “American-
democratic-process” and the people were also unconvinced that their leaders would be able 
to remain neutral given the potential President’s conflict of interests; which was to repay 
corporate-backers with political favouritism in lieu of large campaign funding. The Tillman 
Act however was never stringently enforced and corporate entities continue to influence 
American federal policies through a multitude of ways, from funding political aspirants to 
lobbying politicians through trade associations and even resorting to full-fledged threats of 
withdrawing direct investment in development schemes.156 
Today, American politics is greatly influenced by the presence of Political Action 
Committees or “PACs”157, which are essentially non-profit organisations set-up and directed 
by corporations.158 The purpose of a PAC is to choose and then subsequently support viable 
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Corporation’s CEO.political candidates, whose policies are agreeable to the interests of the PAC’s founding 
corporation. After which, the PAC will offer campaign contributions and further the chosen 
candidate’s political convictions through wide-reaching mediums, such as television, radio 
and newspaper advertisements.159 Also, as Golden discovered from her investigations, 
corporations accounted for more than 67% of all information relied upon for the decision-
making processes adopted by US regulatory agencies. The remaining 33% consisted of 
comments made by citizen groups, unions and other governmental agency groups (which 
were the second highest contributors).160 This led Golden to remark that this was due to two 
inherent aspects of corporations: (1) the superior organisational skills that corporations had 
in comparison to other smaller interest groups and (2) the strong informational networks 
available to corporations.161
Under the current provisions of the law, Corporations are recognised as artificial beings and 
are granted the same legal rights as any natural individual.162 As exemplified above however, 
Corporations have the ability to amass and efficiently organise vast pools of financial wealth 
and manpower, far greater than any natural person ever could. In the realm of intellectual 
property law, this is problematic because a corporation is granted the same control rights as 
an independent creator and yet both have differing limitations in their respective abilities to 
enforce those rights.163 And in reality, the law thus creates an often overlooked social 
injustice. Christopher May argues that this inequality should be corrected through a re-
consideration of the current legal priorities between artificial and natural persons and that the 
classification of both under the law should not be one-and-the-same given the vast 
differences between the two.164 
For example, a survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Associaton, 
found that the average litigation costs to defend against a patent infringement suit ranged 
from a jaw-dropping USD$650,000 to USD$5 million depending on the amount of damages 
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164 Ibid, 142 - 3.sought by the plaintiff.165 In that regard, it is unfair given that a corporation would be able to 
defend itself against an expensive lawsuit, while an individual would not. The second 
problem that this unfairness creates would be the ability of a corporation to access 
information, which is not uniformly applicable to a natural individual either.166 An example 
of which would be a corporation’s ability to afford expensive technological licenses, which 
was a USD$22 billion industry in and of itself in 2008.167 The culmination of both 
inequalities are effectively stomping out weaker independent creators; since they are unable 
to legally acquire the technology necessary to compete with other technological giants. 
Independent creators often do not even dare contemplate using such technologies on the sly, 
as simply defending a patent infringement suit can be financially ruinous.168 To cite 
Lawrence Lessig, the effect of this combination of issues has therefore led to the 
deterioration of intellectual property to the point where protection merely means having the 
sufficient finances “to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create”.169 
Next, Stephen Barley also states that it is logical to expect that the level of corporate 
influence is not merely confined to domestic governments and has corporations also have the 
ability to affect regional (e.g. the European Union) and even international institutions (like 
the WTO, WIPO and the UN).170 The reasons for why corporations seek stronger global 
protection over intellectual property is self-explanatory. Since having an internationally 
uniform regime grants uniform enforceability of rights and allows corporate right holders to 
deepen their control over the domestic regulatory environment in any nation.171 Corporations 
manipulate global policies through their host-nations, which act as their political mouthpiece 
within international forums. 
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171 Sell, see note 147, 13.An example of which would be the 1990 incident between Chile and the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers of America (or “PMA”).172 During which time, Chile was struggling to resist 
diplomatic pressure from America which was pushing for Chile to reform domestic 
intellectual property laws and in turn grant legislative patent protection over the alliance’s 
pharmaceutical products. Chile resisted so as to prevent the inflation of domestic medicine 
prices, which would ensue once PMA was granted a localised monopoly over medicines 
manufactured within Chilean borders. In 1991 however, under the mounting pressure, 
Chilean law-makers offered a compromise and finally agreed to grant PMA’s medicines a 15 
year protection scheme, rather than remaining resolute on its initial stance which called for 
the absolute rejection of PMA’s demands for patent protection.173 The historical significance 
of this international incident is said by Susan Sell to be the starting point for the subsequent 
establishment of the TRIPS Agreement as a valid source of public international law in 
1994.174 Sell states that the TRIPS agreement enshrines the right-holder-biased protectionism 
left in the residual wake of the Anglo-American intellectual property model. This is because 
the TRIPS agreement was crafted by an ad hoc alliance of 12 members, consisting of 
American corporations and their counterparts from Europe and Japan.175 
The effect of the TRIPS agreement has institutionalised the metaphorical relationship linking 
intellectual goods to real property and supports the commodification of knowledge. The 
TRIPS agreement has also extended the scope of intellectual property by introducing new 
forms of protectable information such as micro-organisms and micro-chip architecture.176 
Furthermore, the TRIPS agreement has deep-reaching regulatory consequences for all 
participating nations (whether developed or developing177) as it seeks to formally harmonise 
the intellectual property regimes of all its signatories through the importation of public 
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TRIPS. Please note that this issue is also discussed in Part III, 4.international law into domestic law.178 Therefore as Sell aptly observes, the implementation 
and causative role played by private interests groups in the creation of the TRIPS agreement 
was monumental and a profound show of global power by corporate conglomerates.179
4. The Enclosure of International Policy Space
In his paper titled “The International Enclosure Movement”, Peter Yu cautions commentators 
and policy makers not to be excessively focused on the concerns related to the enclosure of 
the public intellectual domain. He instead insists that the global politics underlying 
intellectual property must be as equally scrutinised. Yu also offers his own novel 
interpretation of the modern enclosure movement of international policy space as one such 
alternative academic study. The significance of this novel approach to the study of 
intellectual enclosure stems from the fact that modern intellectual property laws are 
implemented at an international level and has a trickle-down effect. Making its way into 
localised legal systems, either through wholesale adoption or through legislative 
rewording.180 This practice, if not properly critiqued, according to Yu “will not only take 
away the policy space individual countries have in their attempts to respond to problems 
within their borders, but also limit their abilities to independently resist and respond to the 
enclosure of the public domain”.181
This newer formulation of international enclosure movement, unlike previous 
interpretations, does not involve the privatisation of intellectual commons, or what 
information was free for all to use. It instead concerns the enclosure of “attractive policy 
options for less developed countries”.182 To put this notion plainly, the enclosure of policy 
space envisions the reduction of political space that nations require to “manoeuvre” and 
make independent decisions concerning its own state affairs. And in the case of intellectual 
property, the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, and the implementation 
of TRIPS as a restrictive set of basal intellectual property protection standards has attributed 
to the “fencing off” and shrinkage of such policy space. This in effect has especially denied 
less developed nations the use of their own discretionary powers and autonomy in matters 
that concern the flexibility of domestic intellectual property systems. Especially for a less 
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182 Ibid, 828.developed nation to enact laws which would best cater and give due deference to the 
respective nation’s social, economic, cultural and technological conditions. 
Less developed nations are particularly disadvantaged and are especially susceptible to the 
enclosure of their own policy space due to their reduced bargaining position at the 
international level.183 And also due to the emergent neo-liberal trends and practices of 
developed nations184; which seeks the harmonisation of intellectual property laws and 
thereby promote uniformity of protection over its own exported goods. This push for the 
process of harmonisation has been predominantly led by America and members of the 
European Union (where corporate lobbying is at its strongest185) and has transformed the 
myriad number of domestic patchwork and piecemeal186 systems of intellectual property into 
a global “supranational code” that imposes fixed obligations on all members under this new 
unified system.187 It is because of this profound power disparity between American and 
European states as opposed to the rest of the world, that has led to this process of 
harmonisation being often referred to as the process of “Westernisation” of intellectual 
property regimes.188
Proponents that support the implementation of western models of intellectual property rights 
onto less developed nations argue that the introduction of intellectual property protection is 
essential for the inward flow of foreign direct investment.189 And with the inward flow of 
investment, it too brings with it consequential and horizontal benefits of technological 
transfer and acts more importantly as a stimulus for industrial development and domestic 
economic growth.190 This inward flow of investment is directly attributed to the new-found 
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190 Yu, see note 67 above, 892 - 4.certainty and confidence that intellectual property guarantees, since right-holders will be able 
to enforce their intellectual property rights against counterfeiters and seek legal 
compensation for any infringement of those rights.191 Because of this, trade negotiators often 
seek to minimise financial risks associated with piracy and counterfeiting192 when bringing 
its technological goods to a developing nation which offers more competitive manufacturing 
capabilities as a result of its cheaper unskilled workforce. This risk-minimising practice is 
done by bundling intellectual property protection provisions with enticing trade deals. Less 
developed nations, eager to experience the advantageous effects that investment brings, often 
do not hesitate to adopt such onerous intellectual property provisions and in the process 
neglect to address the imbalance that such terms create in relation to its own innovative 
capabilities.193 The seemingly advantageous inward flow of investment, associated with the 
imposition of Western patent systems, however, are actually more costly than beneficial for a 
less developed nation.194 This is because a vast amount of resources are required to be 
diverted to set in place infrastructure for the policing of domestic industries for intellectual 
property infringements.195 This expenditure depletes a less developed nation’s scarce 
resources, money and manpower, that would have been better used in other forms of 
infrastructural development.196 However in reality, for less developed nations there is no real 
choice in the matter, since becoming a TRIPS signatory has now become a prerequisite 
condition for a nation’s entry to the WTO.197 Therefore less developed nations are effectively 
coerced into the adoption of the basal intellectual property protection obligations set out in 
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Relations Theorists” (2002) 70 University of Cincinnati Law Review 569, 580.the TRIPS agreement. The alternative to that would be to face total exclusion from the global 
trade market, which in reality is never an option.198
The implementation of the TRIPS agreement is seen as the main mechanism which leads to 
the enclosure and reduction of a nation’s policy space and it does so through several 
significant ways. Firstly, the TRIPS agreement created non-discriminatory patent rights over 
all fields of technology199 and includes any invention be it a product or process.200 This 
requirement to extend patent rights over all areas of technology thus diminishes a nation’s 
ability to effectively choose which of its technological industries it should protect or not. For 
example, fledgling industries are more likely to flourish in an absence of protection and 
instead requires free enterprise which gives leeway to certain forms of intellectual property 
infringement. Since in reality it is necessary for a nation to enforce a wide spectrum of 
varying levels of protection in varying fields.201 As in the field of pharmaceuticals 
manufacturing, the production of generic drugs would allow for more effective mass 
utilisation of medicines and also place less burdens on a nation’s healthcare system since the 
pricing of medical goods and process are not subject to monopolistic price control 
mechanisms.202 
Second, the TRIPS agreement further limits the power of local governments from issuing a 
compulsory license. This was done through the inclusion of TRIPS Article 31(b), which is 
essentially a set of complex procedural rights, legal prerequisites and exceptions establishing 
the circumstances for when a compulsory license may or may not be issued against an 
intellectual property right-holder.203 For example a signatory may not issue a compulsory 
license unless it “has made efforts to obtain authorisation from the right holder on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a 
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202 Yu, see note 67 above, 860.
203 Roffe, Supra note 69, 9.reasonable period of time”.204 Signatories can forego this requirement if compulsory 
licensing is necessary to address state crisis and where the usage of the patent is for non-
commercial domestic usage only. The usage of patents acquired in such instances of state 
emergency however must cease when the urgent circumstances are abated and at which time 
the local state government is to pay “adequate remuneration... taking into account the 
economic value of the authorisation [for the use of the patent]”.205 The inclusion of Article 
31 was consequential from the success of Brazil and the subsequent lobbying of 
pharmaceutical corporations to reduce the ability of state governments from using coercive 
economic threats to ensure discounts over medicines. The resultant inclusion of Article 31, 
on its face, therefore diminishes the discretionary powers that state governments have 
concerning the issuance of compulsory licenses, which was a necessary bargaining chip for 
governments to protect themselves from pharmaceutical bullying. In today’s post-TRIPS 
environment however that is no longer the case and the use of compulsory licenses must 
always be compliant with a right-holder’s ultimate prerogative to reap financial reward.206 
Thirdly, the TRIPS agreement stipulates that all intellectual property disputes arising under 
the agreement must be settled via the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.207 This mandatory 
arbitration process therefore removes a nation’s ability to effectively settle its own disputes 
internally and instead transfers the process into the hands of a third-party. A third-party 
which is often criticised for its positivistic approach towards the enforcement of the law, 
favouring the absolute enforcement of international intellectual property laws rather than 
considering the actual social or economic ramifications that such laws might impose onto a 
nation.208 
Peter Yu further explains how the three examples listed above has attributed to the plight that 
less developed nations experience with the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. Yu 
proffers that the TRIPS agreement was “designed with a focus on setting only the floor, 
rather than the ceiling, of protection”.209 Which means to say that the agreement merely 
focuses on the minimum standards of intellectual property protection and not the maximum 
40
204 Please refer to Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.
205 Please refer to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement.
206 Yu, see note 67 above, 861 - 2.
207 Please refer to Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement.
208 Benvenisti and Downs, see note 60 above, 21.
209 Yu, see note 67 above, 902.level of restriction that may be imposed.210 What this perpetuates therefore is a limitless level 
of intellectual protection, which would overtime be subject to incremental strengthening and 
cease only once absolute control has been achieved.211 This is explicitly stated in Article 1 of 
the TRIPS agreement which states that “members may, but shall not obliged to, implement in 
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement”.212
This misguided focus, according to Yu, produces two negative effects for the global 
intellectual property regime. (1) This base-oriented approach only allows for the 
strengthening of intellectual property laws but never its weakening. And (2) to quote Yu, 
“[the TRIPS Agreement] has made it difficult for countries to take a holistic perspective and 
offer package legislation that includes strengthened protection and public interest offsets, 
especially when the rules are scrutinised by the WTO dispute settlement panels”.213 This 
supports the notion that the WTO dispute settlement panel operates merely as a “one-way 
ratchet”.214 Meaning to say that any complaints to the dispute panel can lead to the rescission 
of domestic laws that reduce the level of intellectual property protection, but fail to address 
any laws which might unreasonably increase protection. It is this positivistic approach which 
has led Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie to incisively comment that disputes “will always unravel in 
the same direction, requiring nations to change those features of their legislation that benefit 
user groups while protection-enhancing provisions stay in place”.215
A practical example of which would be the striking down of the Fairness in Music Licensing 
Act216 which waived the requirement for a public performance license to be necessary for 
bars, restaurants, retail stores and other small business boutiques that wished to play 
protected music within its premises. Yet the companion legislation (the “Sonny Bono Act” 
1998) under the same package deal was left untouched and accounted for the extension of 
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216 Fairness in Music Licensing Act 1998 17 USC § 110.copyright terms.217 Dreyfuss and Dinwoodie further caution that if this unfair bias is not 
addressed then it might allow for the perverse practice of encouraging right-holders to 
initially agree to protection reductions as part of legislative package deals. Given that such 
packages might later be successfully challenged at the WTO dispute resolution panel and 
still allow right-holders to experience the residual benefits granted through the surviving 
legislation.218
Though Yu does not support the global harmonisation of intellectual property laws, he does 
not call for total disharmony either. And even acknowledges that in some instances 
contextualised policy space enclosure can even be beneficial; that is to say that the nation’s 
unique local conditions are not ignored as a result of the eminent enclosure.219 To further 
emphasise how much international policy space has shrunk in the wake of the TRIPS 
agreement, Yu nostalgically recalls the period when global intellectual property law was 
governed under the Paris Convention.220 During the late 1960s, many countries had 
misgivings and conflicts over issues of compulsory licenses, parallel importation, working 
requirements and schematic filing systems.221 Many countries also had ideological 
differences in opinion concerning the concept of intellectual property, for example neither 
Switzerland nor the Netherlands had any recognisable form of patent systems222 and even 
Germany was highly abhorrent to the idea of patent laws.223 As a suitable compromise 
therefore, the Paris Convention favoured an anti-discriminatory stance towards each 
individual member’s level of patent protection.224 This thus left considerable policy space in 
which member nations could explore the optimal level of localised patent protection. This 
allowed for member nations to make either incremental or reductive adjustments to their 
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treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html> at 11 October 2012.patent protection legislature in an effort to provide sufficient entrepreneurial freedom within 
struggling or fledgling industries. The concept of contextualised enclosure is not entirely 
novel nor is it unobtainable, and it could simply be a matter of backtracking through years of 
global legislative strengthening. And in today’s digital age the need for autonomous 
decision-making to create viable localised intellectual property systems has never been more 
crucial.
5. The Consequence of Intellectual Enclosure: Price Inflation and Construction of Scarcity
Thus far, this paper has explored the processes by which intellectual goods are enclosed and 
the reason for its enclosure by the respective right-holders who wish to exploit them. This 
paper has also explored some of the more pragmatic resultant consequences of the enclosure 
of intellectual goods and has alluded to the causative role that monopolistic price inflation 
has had; paying particularly close attention to the issue of access to medication in less 
developed countries. The issue to be addressed now, explores the market forces and the 
underlying factors characteristic of trade; all of which drives the need for corporations to 
price their goods highly and thus create market segregation through discriminatory pricing. 
On the matter of price discrimination225, Boyle states that corporations seek to establish an 
efficient monopoly which is able to achieve perfect price discrimination.226 That is to say, 
corporations ideally want to be able to charge every consumer the exact maximum price for 
its products as the consumer’s ability and willingness to pay will allow.227 Market 
segregation is important to corporations since it successfully identifies and isolates 
consumers with large spending power in any given population and allows for more strategic 
marketing practices through demographic targeting.228 In economic terms, this is 
advantageous as it gives corporations which are essentially intellectual goods vendors, an 
indication of the nature and number of products that should be manufactured and prevents 
wastage through the stockpiling of surplus. This practice also further identifies the most 
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Under the current legislative regimes, the granting of statutory rights over intellectual 
property is not indefinite, and only allows for a temporary monopoly. Right-holders must 
therefore continually reinforce the chronological terms which they might have over their 
intellectual property.229 Besides lobbying for extended terms and thus effectively prolonging 
their monopolistic rights over an intellectual good, right-holders must also ensure that the 
maximum amount of profit is derived before the subsequent expiry and extinguishment of 
their temporary rights. This also goes towards explaining the aggressive attitude with which 
corporations take in their approach towards the pricing of intellectual products. Bearing in 
mind also that a corporation is accountable to all its shareholders and is itself driven by a 
capitalistic agenda; both of which act as the driving force behind a corporation’s persistent 
need to inflate product prices.230 One must thus realise that the main prerogative of any profit 
driven entity is to maximally exploit any and all available revenue streams and in light of the 
influence of external market forces, corporations have adopted certain responsive measures 
to ensure that their monopolies are maximally exploited.231
An example of such a responsive approach, would be the practice of corporations to 
minimise the effect of external costs upon their profit margin. Corporations do so by 
internalising the cost of such externalities and then including it within the sale prices of their 
intellectual goods and as such transfer the burden of externalities onto consumers directly.  
As noted by Christopher May,
the key aspect of the imposition of a property regime over commons is not the 
enjoyment by users of absolute property over their resources, but rather the cost 
they have to take into account when their use conflicts with another owner’s 
interests. By awarding  property rights, what was previously an externality, a 
cost others had to bear, can now be included by charging users on the basis of 
their liability where other’s resources are degraded.232
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232 May, see note 34 above, 129.What May emphasises in this particular quote is that the externality costs envisaged by 
corporations are derived from two main sources, (1) the cost of acquiring another’s 
intellectual resources for the creation of the product and (2) an anxiety that users will 
illegally use, copy or transmit the right-holder’s intellectual property and thereby undermine 
their right to economic reward through missed markets.
 
Firstly, externalities derived from the acquisition of resource includes the purchasing of 
patent licenses and other licensing fees associated with the use of another’s technological 
discoveries and processes.233 And with the increase industry usage of “reach through license 
agreements” (“RTLA”) and overlapping technological patents and protective measures, the 
cost of “intellectual raw-materials” are becoming more expensive and harder to secure.234 
For example an RTLA is created between a patent owner and an individual who wishes to 
use the respective patent as an intellectual resource for his or her own subsequent creative 
efforts. This RTLA thus allows a patent owner the right to reach downstream to collect rents, 
royalties, or options on any discoveries or lucrative products created as a result of the 
secondary user’s own intellectual pursuits. 235 In such an instance, the pricing of a product is 
inflated so as to allow for the remuneration and profit of the subsequent creator and any 
multiple upstream patent contributors.
Secondly, externalities attributable to intellectual property also involves the expensive 
process of lobbying for legislative protection and even the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights against infringers through litigation. Both of which are costly processes and 
are also external costs which are transferred onto the final consumer.236 Right-holders also 
fear the degradation of profit through infringement and take into account such potential 
losses by inflating prices. This market practice of externality transference thus has 
detrimental effects going toward the increasing market segregation and unfairly prejudices 
bona fide consumers; those who have no desire or intention of infringing the right-holder’s 
intellectual property protection.237
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Counterfeit Products” (2007) 5(3) Managing Global Transitions 253, 254.Another method by which corporations seek to maintain and justify higher pricing, as 
attributed to the influence of market factors, would be through the construction of 
“scarcity”.238 Market concerns encourage the concept of “scarcity” because higher prices can 
be justified where resource availability is low. And also where innovative steps have been 
taken to streamline process of creation to reduce resource wastage through the creation of 
lower yield but higher value-added products in favour of mass production. However as 
Kenneth Arrow argues intellectual goods have many characteristics which distinguishes it 
from any other physical goods modelled in economics and cannot therefore suffer from 
resource scarcity.239 
The construction of scarcity over intellectual raw-materials240 can be explained by means of 
deductive reasoning. For example, if no proprietary rights are afforded over information, 
then there is no control, and no construction of scarcity since the protected information 
would be freely available to all. However once the information is freely disseminated or 
made available, it loses any notion of value simply because any product which has no 
demand becomes meaningless as a commodity.241 Take for instance rudimentary scientific 
knowledge that is freely available, it would thus be absurd to expect an individual to pay a 
premium to ascertain that gravity causes objects to fall towards Earth. As such, the central 
purpose of intellectual property rights therefore is to construct an artificial scarcity where 
none exists.242 And as Arrow notes, there are many paths and instances where knowledge 
diffuses readily: (1) piracy, (2) transfer of technology through skilled migration, (3) 
introducing an intellectual product to the market itself increases the probability of successful 
duplication, (4) the sale of written or oral materials for the motive of income generation and 
(5) informal knowledge sharing practices.243 As such corporations suppress and limit the 
dissemination of its informational, technological and scientific discoveries so as to prevent 
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243 Arrow, see note 238 above, 125 - 6.any of their intellectual goods from suffering from the consequence of demand-degradation 
and subsequently price devaluation.244
The fundamental and prophylactic tactic employed by corporations to retain control over 
their intellectual resource would be to maintain secrecy245, which is allowed under the 
TRIPS Agreement since it has established a basal level of protection for trade secrets under 
Article 39(3).246 Alternatively, and more importantly, scarcity is established through the 
assignation of proprietary rights over intellectual goods. This has accounted for the increased 
consciousness shift within the political economy to employ exclusionary rights as a 
predominant power to restrict use rather than to seek compensatory actions after illicit usage 
has occurred.247 It is this move from “holding to withholding”248 that has key implications 
toward understanding the contemporary intellectual property conundrum; or the antagonistic 
relationship between the practice of unfair pricing and its consequential effects of scarcity, 
against the ideals of “social good” in terms of public access to information and intellectual 
goods.249
6. A Case Study of the Impact of Scarcity on Scientific Information 
The creation of scarcity which seeks to suppress the freedom of intellectual raw-material is 
especially profound and problematic in the field of medical discovery and scientific research. 
Fiona Murray and Scott Stern stated that formal intellectual property rights have detrimental 
impacts on the “production and diffusion of ‘dual knowledge’”. 250 Which is a term coined 
by them to encapsulate ideas which (1) have value as scientific discovery and which (2) are 
an inventive construct for future innovation and discovery. Murray and Stern further stress 
that more instances of scientific knowledge is falling within the category of protected and 
withheld information; safeguarded by corporations.The withholding of these ideas for 
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Economy Volume 7 (2007) 33, 34.commercial exploitation is in turn stifling the subsequent outputs of both contemporary and 
future academics in the field of scientific research.251 The reason for this continual 
entanglement between corporate commercialisation and academic research is due to the 
practice of privatised academic funding.252 This elevates the role of universities from mere 
educational institutions to external sources of research and development for wealthy private 
corporations which seek tangible benefits from funding commercially viable scientific 
discoveries.253 The fostering of such relationships between universities and corporations has 
been the subject of much controversy as commentators claim that corporate influence has 
compromised the “purity” of academic research and shifted the focus of research from 
scientific altruism to mere commercialisation.254
An instance of the intertwining relationship between academia and corporate capitalism can 
be clearly seen from the  development of the “Oncomouse” by Phil Leder, a professor in the 
Genetics department at the Harvard Medical School.255 The Oncomouse was the first 
genetically engineered mouse, and was created through novel transgenic techniques 
employed by Professor Leder when an onco-gene was inserted into a mouse embryo.256 This 
resulted in the birth of a mouse which was highly susceptible to cancer and in effect meant 
that a strain of carcinogenic genes had been successfully discovered and isolated.257 This 
research was subsequently published in medical journals and was granted a broad patent by 
the U.S Patent Office in 1988. The successful patenting of the Oncomouse sparked 
controversy since it was the first instance where a living mammal was recognised under the 
law as property. And also because this meant that Harvard’s licensee, Du Pont, could then 
aggressively enforce its proprietary rights over the Oncomouse.258 Du Pont sought to enforce 
RTLAs on subsequent inventions made using the Oncomouse and also demanded review of 
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Anticommons in Biomedical Research” (1998) 280 Science 698, 699.any scientific research publications that used the Oncomouse. This in effect prohibited 
scientists and academics from freely accessing or sharing any raw-scientific-material related 
to the Oncomouse and its contributions to cancer research.259
The protectionistic approach which corporate interference has had on the field of scientific 
research is said to have accounted for the “tragedy of the anti-commons”. A hypothetical 
concept created by Heller and Eisenberg260, which is an intended play-of-words on Hardin’s 
original tragedy argument aimed at dismissing the idea of the commons.261 In the anti-
commons hypothesis, it is argued that too many entities have been granted exclusionary 
rights over privatised scientific knowledge. And this causes the intellectual resource to 
experience under-utilisation rather than over-use or depletion.262 The hypothesis as explained 
by Heller and Eisenberg further stipulates that the control of intellectual property rights by 
corporations can not only inhibit the free flow of scientific knowledge and prevent future 
researchers from cumulatively building upon their predecessor’s discoveries but also creates 
additional access barriers due to a significant increase in transaction costs given the 
fragmentation and overlapping of patent rights necessary for subsequent creation.263 Heller 
and Eisenberg explain this by stating that as the norm of scientific research approaches total 
corporate ownership, then any subsequent attempt at scientific discovery and invention 
would consist of a combination of fragmentised research data belonging concurrently to 
several patent owners each demanding licensing fees or RTLAs.264 A practical example of 
such an increase of access barriers would be patents over biomedical “receptors”.265 In 
Hellen’s and Eisenberg’s words,
[a] recent search of the Lexis patent database disclosed more than 100 issued 
U.S. patents with the term “adrenergic receptor” in the claim language. Such a 
proliferation  of  claims  presents  a  daunting  bargaining  challenge.  Unable  to 
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effect that chemicals have on the longevity of a cell.procure a complete set of licenses, firms choose between diverting resources to 
less promising projects with fewer licensing obstacles or proceeding to animal 
and then clinical testing on the basis of incomplete information.266
Heller and Eisenberg do recognise that the involvement of corporations do allow for an 
injection of innovation. Not so much as an incentive, but rather as a tool of enablement, 
since it grants self-motivated scientists the financial means to further their respective fields 
of research. And as other academics add, the benefit of intellectual property rights can be 
seen through its facilitative contributions in the creation of a market for ideas and in so doing 
encourages the disclosure and exchange knowledge, rather than trade secrecy.267 Yet even in 
light of all its seemingly beneficial consequences, Heller and Eisenberg caution against the 
continual existence of an anti-commons within the field of medical research due to causal 
role in increasing transaction costs, fragmentation of intellectual property ownership and the 
heterogenous interests amongst corporate owners all of which erects barriers to a scientist’s 
access to pre-existing medical research and stifles future scientific outputs for the betterment 
of society.268
PART IV - THE ADVENT OF PIRACY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET
1. The Need for Fairer Pricing and the Internet
As is the case in any debate involving two radically opposing ideals held by differing parties, 
at present between intellectual property users and right-holders, the logical solution would be 
to find a fair and median compromise. In this situation, the pricing of an intellectual good 
must not be inflated, but instead should be set reasonably, enough that both the demands of 
users and right-holders can be met. By doing so, a right-holder still maintains his right to 
profit from allowing another the privilege of using his intellectual property, while still 
allowing the said property to be made maximally available to users to access owing to its 
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Eisenberg, see note 258 above, 700.affordability.269 Or in the case of medicines, Flynn, Hollis and Palemedo state that medicines 
should be accessible to consumers through more competitive pricing and yet the pricing 
should remain profitable enough to allow pharmaceutical corporations to subsidise further 
research and develop medicines for future generations to come.270
Yet, the very thought of placing a seemingly “reasonable” price on a particular product is 
itself cause for much discourse. Since an author or inventor values the creation of a product 
or work based on abstract sums of: (1) how much effort and resource is expended in the 
process of creation, (2) the perceived benefit that the product or work provides to society and 
lastly (3) an element of profit-incentive.271 The next requirement that is to be satisfied would 
be the constructive knowledge present within the consumers themselves, which is to say: the 
consumer must fully appreciate the qualities and characteristics present within that particular 
product, and having internalised those qualities, must come to the objective conclusion that 
the product is of good value-for-money.272 
Despite the fact that the complexities associated with price estimation are daunting, 
intellectual property owners nevertheless must still bear the onus of ensuring that the pricing 
of their goods are non-discriminatory, meaning that it is not inflated to the point where 
consumers are barred access through no fault of their own, except that the goods are simply 
beyond their financial capacity.273 This may not seem like a serious issue in relation to 
technological luxury goods; an individual certainly would not experience any serious 
impairment without the latest mobile phone or tablet. This “don’t-buy-it-if-you-can’t-afford-
it” approach however is inadequate if it is to consider larger social welfare implications such 
as the overpricing of medication crucial to sustaining life or even the overpricing of or 
cultural content necessary for educative enrichment.
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273 May, see note 34 above, 141.Professor Wendy Gordon has warned that high pricing also poses a detriment to intellectual 
property owners/vendors themselves, as it could allow for “market failure”.274 In her paper, 
Professor Gordon posits that stronger intellectual property protection schemes could cause 
products to become too expensive and inefficient to sell within a market and the result of 
which would effectively cause the alienation of any potential consumers and drive them to 
seek cheaper alternatives instead. A solution proposed by Professor Gordon, was that high-
pricing could be cured through accessible, low-cost marketing and smaller automated 
transactions (or “micro-transactions”).275 By establishing an accessible and direct market 
channel that consumers can readily rely on, they will then have no need to find illicit means 
to obtain the desired product. Vendors can also reduce the number of resellers and additional 
external costs within the chain of sale, which the product takes en route to the consumer, and 
can thereby reduce price inflation resultant from the number of increased transaction 
costs.276 
The two notions raised above, (1) the need to increase consumer knowledge of an 
intellectual product and (2) the need for international “micro-transactions” can be taken in 
combination as a viable approach to combatting high price inflation. And as James Boyle 
points out, the Internet embodies the ideal mechanism to do just that.277 Online stores have 
the potential to offer widespread accessibility across the globe and also offer a direct market 
linkage between vendors and consumers. Transactions through online stores are also 
automated and thereby eliminate externalities associated with distributorship and operating 
conventional retail shopfronts; such as staff wages, shop rental and utility fees. The reason 
why such intellectual property vendors have yet to fully embrace such an Internet 
phenomena would be due to the consequential effect that the increased competitiveness of 
online transactions will inadvertently have on their conventional shopfront businesses, which 
will undoubtedly suffer from a decline in profitability.278 However, for the sake of consumer 
satisfaction and welfare, business models must be adaptable and must be flexible in its 
approach towards revenue generation.279 
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Article 1, 2 - 3.Boyle further states that the Internet  does offer several disadvantages as it also lowers the 
cost of copying and obviously attributes too to increased instances of illicit transmission and 
file-sharing. The advantages of the Internet however far outweighs its disadvantages, since it 
also allows for lowered costs of production, distribution, advertising and exponentially 
increases the exposure that vendors have to that of the potential global market. And as aptly 
put by Boyle, “[a] large leaky market may actually provide more revenue than a small one 
over which one’s control is much stronger”.280 This analogy is used to rebut any arguments 
put forward by fearful and skeptical intellectual property right-holders which present the 
Internet in a negative light; as a dangerous medium for trade owing to the ease of digital 
content infringement and which should be strongly regulated.
2. A Case Study of Corporate Culture Embracing the Internet
In April 2003, Apple Computer launched its new flagship store. The difference, however, 
between this store and any of Apple’s pre-existing conventional stores was that this store was 
located online: the iTunes Music Store.281 The launch of Apple’s iTunes store was a 
resounding success; having sold 30 million downloads by the end of the year.282 Apple’s 99-
cent-song business model, pioneered through its iTunes store, has since revolutionised the 
way in which digital medium files are sold and transmitted over the Internet. The store 
charged a mere 99 cents for an individual song and about USD$9.99 for an entire album. For 
the first time in history, low-priced music downloads from five major record labels were 
made legitimately available online in one concise source.283 At the close of 2003, both 
Fortune and Times Magazines crowned iTunes as the “Product of the Year” 284 and the 
“Invention of the Year”285 respectively. Since then many corporations have tried to mimic 
Apple’s success. Other less successful emulations have faded into obscurity, but some have 
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www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/04/28Apple-Launches-the-iTunes-Music-Store.html> at 11 
October 2012. Apple launched iTunes on April 28 2003, and Steve Jobs is quoted saying: 
“The iTunes Music Store offers the revolutionary rights to burn an unlimited number of CDs 
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282 Frank Ahrens, Music Fans Find Online Jukebox Half-Empty, Washington Post 
(Washington), 19 January 2004, A1.
283 Laurie J Flynn, “Apple Offers Music Downloads with Unique Pricing”, New York Times 
(New York) 29 April 2003, C2.
284 Peter Lewis, “Product of the Year”, Fortune (New York) 22 December 2003, 188.
285 Chris Taylor, “The 99 cent Solution”, Time (New York) 17 November 2003, 66, 68.experienced equally triumphant results.286 For example, Roxio subsequently purchased 
Napster’s287 name and intellectual property assets during Naptster’s bankruptcy proceedings 
in October 2003288, following Napster’s infamous litigation against Heavy Metal band 
Metallica.289 Roxio subsequently relaunched Napster as a music downloading service which 
also offered 99-cent-songs and a $10 subscription free which granted users unlimited access 
to music content and faster “tethered downloads”.290 And in a bid to compete with Apple, the 
newly relaunched Napster entered into subsequent agreements with Samsung to co-market 
Napster’s music store.291 This co-venture with Samsung has since become the basic 
foundation for Apple’s biggest rival; the Android Store.
The appeal and success of iTunes, besides its cheap prices, was also attributed to its notion 
of legitimacy; which for customers meant guilt-free downloads, and the avoidance of 
spyware and viruses which were often piggy-backed onto illegal downloads.292 However 
there is growing discontent with Apple’s iTunes amongst contemporary users, ranging from 
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292 Yu 2, see note 288 above, 432.security breaches and unauthorised charges on users’ accounts293 to the recently debated fact 
that iTunes subscribers do not have ownership rights over their content downloads and 
purchases.294 Though this recent debate has been brought about by questionable sources295, it 
however does not detract from the important social issues which such a debate raises. (1) 
iTunes users do not actually own the music they have purchased and are therefore not 
extended any form of proprietary rights over their digital music collections. And (2) this late 
realisation of the fact is due to the complex and arduous nature of Apple’s iTunes Licensing 
Agreement which spans over 56 iPhone screens296 or 41 conventional A4 sized pages.297 The 
implementation of  Apple’s mass licensing practice was launched at the time of its creation 
in 2003 but has now become a topic of hot debate only 9 years later. As author Mel Martin 
satirically remarks, “I've bought cars with less paperwork. [Come on], Apple. Get it 
together.”298 Such a quote exemplifies the outrage and dissatisfaction that consumers have 
towards Apple, and has caused consumers to view the unnecessarily long and complex 
agreement as a means employed by Apple to intentionally confound and prevent consumers 
from fully understanding their rights under Apple’s terms of use. The phrase also emphasises 
the difficulties that a lay-person would have with deciphering such a lengthy agreement; 
provided that the ordinary lay-person even entertains the slightest desire to read the 
agreement at all.
By converting intellectual products from a proprietary good into a mere “service for use” in 
Apple’s mass licensing approach, it denies consumers the same protections or rights they 
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296 Mel Martin, “Got Time to Spare? Read the iTunes Store Agreement” TUAW.com (2011) 
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terms.html#SERVICE> at 11 October 2012.
298 Martin, see note 296 above.would ordinarily have if they were to purchase an intellectual product through any other 
legitimate or conventional means.299 As aptly noted in The Digital Dilemma, “[b]uy a book 
and you own it forever; pay for a service and when the period of service is over, you 
(typically) retain nothing”.300 The effect of which means the lost of hundreds and even 
thousands of dollars of purchases for minor or accidental breaches against Apple’s onerous 
Licensing Agreement (termination of an account is a discretionary right held by Apple at all 
times) or even a hardware failure on the consumer’s part.301And this also allows Apple and 
the respective music copyright holders to extend its restrictive control over downloaders 
unreasonably. Since licensed downloads grant only a right to use, it does not transfer 
ownership of the digital content onto the consumer, who are therefore not extended the 
privileges within Fair Use exceptions. For example, a consumer may not employ the legal 
justification governed under the “first-sale doctrine” to legally create or acquire copies of a 
copyrighted work following the user’s bona fide purchase of the intellectual property. Also, 
consumers are barred from transferring music files from their computer to other mediums 
disallowed under Apple’s Licensing Agreement. For example, though a consumer is allowed 
to synchronise his music onto his iPod, he may not however move his music onto a third-
party music player or home entertainment system.302 
Another problematic issue associated with the use of iTunes’ mass licensing practice is that it 
fails to recognise the fact that many record companies do not have the rights to release all of 
its content onto the Internet.303 The reason for this is because recording companies may own 
the copyright in the sound recording (the expression) but may not have statutory rights over 
the use of the composition of the song itself. For example, recording companies might 
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already purchased owing to the fact that contrary to the “iTunes Store Terms of Sale”.
302 Yu 3, see note 291,  702.
303 Lydia P Loren, “Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights” (2003) 53 Case Western 
Reserve Law Review 673, 697 - 8.therefore have the right to release a song on a physical medium (such as compact disks)304, 
but may not do so in a digital format for online consumption which requires rights for both 
the sound recording and the actual composition.305 Further, record companies may even be 
unwilling to provide content306 to which it does have the rights to release, since iTunes 
downloads are susceptible to unauthorised hacking by third-party softwares which allow 
users to import songs from their iTunes libraries directly onto their hard-disks.307 As such, 
though the iTunes store may offer more than 20 million songs for download308, this figure 
however pales in comparison to the number of songs available on illegal peer-to-peer 
(“P2P”)309 networks.310 
As Peter Yu remarks, “[u]nless music content is released without restrictions, consumers are 
unlikely to be satisfied and will eventually turn to black markets in the Darknet or use illegal 
means to relocate their legally purchased music files”.311 What Yu stresses in this quote is 
57
304 John Borland, “Beatles Catalog Headed for Digital Distribution?” CNET News.com 
(2004) <http://news.cnet.com/Beatles-catalog-headed-for-digital-distribution/
2100-1027_3-5228914.html> at 11 October 2012.
305 Jessica Litman, “Sharing and Stealing” (2004) 27 Hastings Communication and 
Entertainment Law Journal 1, 21 - 2.
306 There are also other considerations, for example a music content provider maybe 
unwilling to allow its music on iTunes arising out of negotiation disputes and pricing. For 
example please see Greg Sandoval, “Music Publisher Blocked iPhone 5 Music Service” 
CNET News.com (2012) <http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57522219-93/music-publisher-
blocked-iphone-5-music-service-report-says/> at 11 October 2012.
307 Lars Pasveer, “Hacker Takes Bite Out of Apple’s iTunes”, CNET News.com  (2004) 
<http://news.cnet.com/2100-1002_3-5308337.html> at 11 October 2012.
308 Leena Rao, “Apple: iTunes Now has 20M Songs; Over 16B Downloads”, Techcrunch 
(October 4, 2011)  <http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/04/apple-itunes-now-has-20-million-
songs-over-16-billion-downloads/> at 11 October 2012.
309 P2P networks are synonymous with the names Napster and KaZaA which were software 
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any file hosting services. For more information, see: Parameswaran Manoj and Susarla 
Anjana “P2P Networking: An Information Sharing Alternatives” (2001) Computer Practices 
31, 31 - 2.
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File Sharing” (2008) Electronic Frontier Foundation White Paper 1, 2 - 4. Lohmann also 
explains the reasoning behind why P2P networks can offer more songs, which is because 
users can upload esoteric genres of content and not just popular mainstream content for 
download. P2P networks also offer out-of-print content which can no longer be found 
commercially. All of which, makes content more readily available on illegal file-sharing 
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311 Yu 3, see note 291 above, 702.that legalised and commercialised methods of online transactions are often subject to 
unnecessary hassle and restrictions owing to right-holders trying to fervently protect their 
intellectual property. This is off-putting for consumers and will leave users, whom have had 
bad experiences with such legalised online stores, to shun legitimate practices and instead 
encourages more users to seek out more attractive illegal alternatives. In simple terms, if 
legalised stores want to compete with illicit download platforms, corporate right-holders 
must strive to be as attractive, if not more attractive, to entice and retain its consumer base312 
and justify why consumers should purchase their products and not illegally download free 
content.
At the close of 2011, Apple announced that it had delivered 16 billion song downloads to 
consumers since its launch in 2003.313 However economic and tech-analysts maintain that 
iTunes itself is not a monolithic “money maker” since its 99-cent-business-model actually 
allows for very little direct profit. As explained by Peter Kafka, the iTunes store is seen by 
Apple as a supplementary mode of service-provision which is meant to compliment Apple’s 
primary form of business; the sale of technological products.314 Though the iTunes store, as a 
valid money-making business model, is being questioned, as a case study however, it is 
significant because it raises the pertinent issue of whether the cheaper pricing of intellectual 
goods will be sufficient to encourage legitimate purchases and ultimately to discourage 
online piracy. In this instance the marriage of cheaper prices and the transference of 
intellectual property rights onto consumers has not been as seamless as it ought to be. Given 
the long-reaching and intrusive restrictions that are subsequently placed on content that 
consumers have legitimately purchased. What this case study therefore exemplifies is this: 
(1) consumers are willing to pay for legitimate intellectual goods provided the price is 
reasonable and affordable. And with that exchange of money, (2) consumers also expect a 
certain level of protection and freedom over the goods which have now come under their 
possession. This unwillingness, by intellectual good vendors to embrace either of the two 
consumer prerequisites, is what is driving the upward swell of online piracy.
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apps-not-much-profit/> at 11 October 2012.3. The Proliferation of Internet File-Sharing
In 2011, researchers at markmonitor.com classified 43 unique websites as being “digital 
piracy sites” which offer file-hosting services and direct download capabilities for illegally 
uploaded copyrighted content.315 According to their investigations, the online traffic 
generated by these sites exceeded 146 million distinct visits per day or 53 billion visits per 
year.316 From those 43 sites, the Top 3 sites (rapidshare.com, megavideo.com and 
megaupload.com) alone were estimated to generate 21 billion visits per year.317 These 
figures however are merely the tip of the iceberg, since they reflect but one form of illegal 
file-sharing activity. In truth, there are myriads of zero-cost alternatives and forms of illegal 
file-sharing which online denizens use to download songs, ebooks and movies. Other 
alternatives besides those direct download websites also include file-sharing P2P 
networks318, video streaming sites and even softwares which allow “reverse ripping”.319
In the United States, Vice President Joe Biden openly condemned illegal online file-sharing 
in a press conference in 2010. Biden, introducing the American government’s latest Joint 
Strategy Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement320, stated that “piracy is theft. Clean and 
simple. It’s smash and grab. It [is] no different than smashing a window at Tiffany’s and 
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319 Reverse ripping software allows users to enter a video’s URL into its program, and after a 
short conversion process, converts the nominated video link into a downloadable file (either 
in pure audio format, or in a video and audio format). This software is used to predominantly 
download videos from youtube.com, a legitimate streaming website often used by major 
record labels to promote their music through viral marketing. For an example see: <http://
www.ytddownloader.com/> at 11 October 2012.
320 Available here: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty_strategic_plan.pdf> at 11 October 2012.grabbing [merchandise]”.321 The Vice President’s comments reflect the prosophobia322 that 
governments and intellectual property right-holders have in relation to Internet file-sharing. 
The reasons for this discourse is because file-sharing is seen to attribute to two consequential 
effects: (1) criminality which defies state law and authority, and (2) missed markets which 
causes intellectual property right-holders a loss of income for every instance their digital 
goods are enjoyed for free.323 Yet the justifications for the condemnation of Internet file-
sharing fails to address larger issues such as the psychological mindset of consumers, the 
non-rivalrous nature324 of digital intellectual property or its self-perpetuating and causative 
role in propagating Internet piracy. As Brett Caraway astutely observes, “[o]ur current 
understanding of the social dimensions of file sharing is inadequate. In some sense, the term 
‘piracy’ camouflages the complex structural foundation of file-sharing activities”.325
Just this year, Caraway conducted an independent survey which queried 357 active file-
sharers to investigate and identify the “structures which condition file-sharing activities”.326 
The question posed was this: “Why do you use P2P applications to acquire music, movies or 
television programs?”. And as Caraway discovered, many respondents to the survey cited 
economic motivations as their top reasoning (183 votes out of 357 participants, or 51.3% of 
the total participants). These respondents also went on to further elaborate that 
unemployment, financial hardship and the generally high cost of content were some of the 
economic motivations alluded to. Other reasons cited by file-sharers also included the fact 
that P2P networks offered higher quality content as opposed to conventional mediums 
(ranked 2nd with 171 votes), and that some content was unavailable in local markets (ranked 
3rd with 121 votes). This was especially the case where expatriates from Western nations 
desired access to content from their country of origin or content in their own mother tongue. 
Also, a significant number of file-sharers stated that in some instances they merely wanted to 
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323 Brett R Caraway, “Piracy Cultures: Survey of File-Sharing Culture” (2012) 6 
International Journal of Communication 564, 564.
324 As previously discussed, intellectual property is non-rivalrous, meaning to say that an 
individual is not deprived if an intellectual good is privatised owing to the fact that many 
individuals can enjoy it simultaneously. This argument has also been reversed to justify 
piracy which states that the right-holder need not defend his intellectual property rights so 
vehemently since copying is not actually theft since the right-holder is not actually deprived 
of his own use of the intellectual property either. For more on this debate, please refer to 
Green, see note 9 above.
325 Caraway, see note 323 above, 564.
326 Ibid, 567.preview the content prior to deciding whether or not they would purchase the content 
through legitimate channels (this reasoning ranked 4th with 71 votes in total). Lastly, another 
significant finding of the survey also showed discontent and dissatisfaction with digital 
rights management systems such as those employed by Apple’s iTunes store which prevents 
the transference of music files from one storage device to another. As such, file-sharers were 
forced to re-download content which they had already purchased so as to avoid the 
restriction of format-shifting (this ranked 8th with 34 votes). 327
Though the survey results above are merely exploratory and are not truly indicative of the 
general sentiments of the entire file-sharing community. It does however give us a practical 
indicia of the problematic effects that intellectual property regimes have on content pricing 
and market segregation. And these practical results further reinforce the theoretical stance 
that academics like Clay Shirky take. Shirky states that Internet piracy is not so much an 
unwillingness by file-sharers to abide by State laws or an open display of civil disobedience 
or even the extreme scenario of outright theft328 as posited by Vice President Biden. What 
Shirky argues instead is that the behaviour of file-sharers is merely an unexpected turn in 
consumer demand for cheaper prices and not the absolute rejection of any recognisable 
pricing system.329 As shown through the previous case study of Apple’s iTunes Store, 
consumers are willing to pay for legitimate content provided the price is reasonable.330 
However to reiterate, the set of schemes implemented by the music industry known as the 
Digital Rights Management, seeks to place as many restrictions on digital format content as 
in the physical world; the inconvenience of copying and transferring music between devices 
associated with compact disks is to be similarly placed on digital downloads so as to 
discourage piracy. And furthermore, the music industry’s approach towards digital content 
pricing is said by Shirky to be an uneducated estimate since the rationale is thus: “the music-
loving public should be willing to pay the same price for a song whether delivered on CD or 
downloaded”.331 
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331 Shirky, see note 328 above, 27.In reality however, savvy consumers know the economic costs involved with physical 
commodities, such as the pressing of compact discs, shipping and distribution costs and 
retail inflation does not however plague digital content.332 As such, the pricing system which 
makes digital downloads comparable to its physical counterparts is unreasonable given that 
digital content is cheaper to sell and distribute. The approach adopted by the music industry 
is therefore seen by other academics such as Cenite, Wang, Peiwen and Chan, as being 
counter-productive since it perpetuates market imperfections, which then promotes the 
practice of online piracy that costly lobbying seeks to eradicate.333 In an attempt to downplay 
the element of consumerist civil disobedience, Shirky compares the online piracy movement 
to that of Prohibition in America. In the context of the 1920s ban on alcohol, the 
criminalisation of alcohol actually increased instances of illegal-bootleg alcohol 
consumption and caused illegal alcohol manufacturing to flourish as black-market trade 
blossomed. Following the dissolution of Prohibition laws however, illicit alcohol 
manufacturing and consumption dropped drastically and has since been abolished. This is 
because alcohol became “legally available at a price and with restrictions people could live 
with”, there was therefore no longer a demand for illegal alternative sources of alcohol.334
Similarly, what is needed in the context of Internet piracy is therefore neither the drastic 
collapse of legal and commercial mechanisms of control proposed by Internet anarchists, nor 
the absolute tightening of regulatory control demanded by fanatical intellectual property 
proponents. It is simply this: the relaxation of restrictions and the reformation of business 
models to evolve and suit the economics of the Internet age. As Shirky proffers, the 
relaxation of the music industry’s interference with Internet politics will not diminish their 
functionality in any other way besides the physical production of compact discs. Rather the 
music industry should embrace the dissolution of the vexatious problems associated with the 
distribution of physical compact disks. And focus instead on bankrolling and publicising 
musicians on a global forum through low-cost innovative viral marketing and reap the 
abundant profits derived from global content sales.335 
62
332 Shirky, see note 328 above, 27 - 8.
333 Cenite, Wang, Peiwen and Chan, “More than Just Free Content: Motivations of Peer-to-
Peer File Sharers” (2009) 33(3) Journal of Communication Inquiry 206, 211.
334 Shirky, see note 313, 27.
335 Ibid, 28.4. A Regulatory Effort and an Internet Revolution
In early 2012, the United States congress was in the midst of deciding the workability of the 
passing of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act 
(PIPA). Both of which were intended to combat against the increasing surge of online piracy 
and counterfeiting taking place beyond America’s legal jurisdiction.336 Simultaneously the 
Internet community was in uproar. For the first time in its history Wikipedia intentionally 
turned off its servers in protest, and other popular social news websites like Reddit followed 
suit. Even Google placed a black banner over its iconic four-coloured logo in an attempt to 
emphasis its distaste of involuntary censorship of Internet content.337 And for weeks leading 
up to the 18th January protests, individual “hacktivists” took to popular social networking 
website Facebook to educate the masses of the detrimental effects that SOPA and PIPA 
would have on the online intellectual commons. Fortunately, the congressional critics were 
heard and their arguments were sufficient to denounce the proposed laws, which were seen 
to be overly broad and would be ineffective as a regulatory tool for the Internet. Making 
direct reference to certain parts of the legislation, critics attacked the judicial reasoning 
behind holding search-engines like Google and YouTube directly accountable for leading 
users to pirated content. Additionally SOPA and PIPA would have granted Internet service 
providers (ISPs) the right to remove any websites that allegedly hosted protected content 
under existing intellectual property laws.338 Both the SOPA and PIPA, as part of the same 
legislative package, were heavily backed by both the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA)339 and the Record Industry Association of American (RIAA) which spent an 
estimated USD$8 million lobbying the bills in congress.340 
63
336 Christian Yoder, “A Post-SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) Shift in International Intellectual 
Property Norm Creation” (2012) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 1, 1.
337 J Wortham, “Public Outcry of Antipiracy Bills Began as Grassroots Grumbling”, The New 
York Times (New York) 19 January 2012, B1.
338 Yoder, see note 336 above, 1.
339 The MPAA has also taken up arms and joined the fray of intellectual property 
enforcement since movie piracy via file-sharing on both P2P networks and streaming 
websites has become very rampant. According to a study conducted in 2006, it was estimated 
that American movie studios lost nearly USD$6.1 Billion in global sales revenue due to 
piracy in 2005 alone. See Sarah McBride and Geoffrey Folwer, Studios See Big Rise in 
Estimates of Losses to Movie Piracy, The Wall Street Journal (2006) <http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB114662361192442291.html?mod=home> at 11 October 2012.
340 Center for Responsive Politics, “Influence and Lobbying”, Opensecrets.org (2011) 
<http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=B02&year=a> at 11 October 2012.This overly aggressive approach coupled with the unabashed “money-throwing” of the film 
and music industry was a throwback to 2003 when the RIAA commenced thousands of legal 
proceedings against alleged music copyright infringers.341 And in the RIAA’s crosshairs was 
“virtually everybody”, including telecommunications service providers, consumer 
electronics developers, Internet entrepreneurs, universities, college researchers, students342 
and even individual claims against ordinary users en masse.343 As Yu noted, in the wake of 
such actions, the general public has become increasingly educated in the pitfalls of online 
piracy but have also grown to regard copyright protectionism with disdain.344 The strong-arm 
tactics employed by the RIAA has in effect antagonised and alienated its consumer market 
and has altered consumer opinion of the RIAA in this public relations fiasco.345 Consumers 
now view the music industry as a ruthless power-hungry-entity bent on punishing even the 
most trivial of infringements with severe and costly lawsuits brought against ordinary 
citizens with shallow pockets. Worse still, such unnecessarily aggressive tactics will threaten 
to drive illicit copying and transmission activities further underground and force file-sharers 
to innovate and sophisticate the current methods of illicit file-sharing. 
For example, Internet pirates have turned to proxy file-hosting servers, the creation of 
offshore websites in nations with more relaxed laws towards online intellectual property 
infringement, and encrypted P2P systems which are able to mask data; thus making the 
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341 William Henslee, “Money for Nothing and Music for Free? Why The RIAA Should 
Continue to Sue Illegal File-Sharers” (2009) 9 John Marshall Review of Intellectual 
Property Law 1, 1. According to Henslee, the RIAA has sued over 35,000 people for illegal 
file-sharing of music as of 2009.
342 Neil W Netanel,”Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing” (2003) 17 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 1, 7 - 8.
343 Yu 3, see note 291 above, 682. 
344 Ibid, 665.
345 Yu 2, see note 288 above, 442 - 3.transmission of protected files virtually undetectable.346 As Geek.com reports347, citing 
directly the RIAA’s and MPAA’s insistence on seeking out individuals through unique IP 
addresses in an attempt to prosecute with legal action. The Pirate Bay (one of the largest 
online P2P and BitTorrent file-sharing websites) has launched two Virtual Private Network 
(“VPN”)348 services. The first VPN service (iPredator) is available to users for a fee, costing 
EUR$15 for 3 months worth of unlimited access, while the second VPN (PrivitizeVPN) 
service embraces the “free-to-use-advertising” business model. This allows users to freely 
access the VPN service without any fees, but forces users to install advertising software (or 
“adware”) which intrusively alters a users homepage and Internet search preferences to the 
VPN sponsor’s nominated webpages.349 Further reports also announced The Pirate Bay’s 
goal of launching the world’s first unmanned aerial server drones.350 Citing the recent 
prosecution of Megaupload.com’s founder Kim Schmitz351, and in anticipation of the passing 
of SOPA and PIPA, these server drones are to be built with the intention of hovering beyond 
the jurisdiction and policing of any Earth-bound authorities. Though it might seem like an 
idea that borders on the realm of science-fiction, such flying drone servers do actually exist 
65
346 Internet service providers track data not so much on the basis of what files are actually 
being transmitted, but engage in what is known as “traffic management” which identifies the 
download usage or activity related with P2P services and de-prioritises the bandwidth 
consumption of such users, which in effect slows download speeds of P2P users to a crawl, 
making it a painfully frustrating means of file-sharing. This is in an effort by ISPs to regulate 
and prevent illegal file-sharing under the guise of a network management practices to reduce 
user “congestion”. Therefore to prevent such “de-priorisation”, pirates allow for the 
encryption of data transmissions and prevent the slowing of P2P users’ capped download and 
upload rates. For more information on such congestion combatting practices see: Benjamin 
Lennett, “ Dis-Empowering Users vs. Maintaining Internet Freedom: Network Management 
and Quality of Service (QoS)” (2009) 18 Commlaw Conspectus 97, 97 - 9.
347 Matthew Humphries, “The Pirate Bay Launches Free VPN Service PrivitizeVPN 
(Updated)” TheGeek (2012) <http://www.geek.com/articles/news/the-pirate-bay-launches-
free-vpn-service-privitizevpn-20120828/> at 11 October 2012.
348 VPNs are private network servers which are isolated from mainstream internet networks. 
With the addition of varying levels of security, data traffic streams and user IP addresses are 
kept totally separate from any form of conventional tracking or regulatory monitoring. For 
more information please see Microsoft’s technical assistance page: <http://
technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb742566.aspx> at 11 October 2012.
349 Humphries, see note 347 above.
350 Francis Bea, “No Wires, No Laws, No Limits: How a Flying Drone Network Could 
Liberate the Internet from Above” DigitalTrends (2012) <http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-
tech/no-wires-no-laws-no-limits-how-a-flying-drone-network-could-liberate-the-internet-
from-above/> at 11 October 2012.
351 Nick Perry, “Kim Dotcom plans Megaupload Reboot”, The Age (2012) <http://
www.theage.com.au/technology/technology-news/kim-dotcom-plans-megaupload-
reboot-20121012-27gpa.html> at 11 October 2012.and are guided by GPS satellite data which automatically and randomly directs its position at 
any given time.352
At the forefront, of such a resurgence of innovative regulatory-countermeasures by Internet 
pirates, is Kim Schmitz.353 Schmitz, who was indicted for racketeering charges by the 
American Federal Bureau of Investigation and whose website, Megaupload.com was shut 
down for copyright infringements causing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damages 
to the film and music industries since its operation in 2005.354 Schmitz, or more commonly 
referred to by his monikers,“Dotcom” and “the Pirate King”, however remains undeterred 
and has announced plans to relaunch a brand new Megaupload website by the close of 2012. 
In a series of twitter messages, Schmitz stated that the new site, dubbed “new Mega” will 
offer a simple one-click encryption option for users to protect their data from being tracked 
or monitored by United States regulatory watchdogs.355
Schmitz also further went on to state that all data transfer and file-sharing services will be 
hosted outside of the United States so as to avoid American jurisdictional interference. Along 
with the relaunching of megaupload.com, Schmitz plans to introduce a revolutionary direct 
download music portal which seeks to eliminate the need for any music industry 
representation and industry royalty fees related to musician marketing and endorsement. The 
music portal site, to be called “megabox”, also further promises to pay all respective 
musicians 90% of the revenue generated from the sale and download of their music.356 
Megabox also embraces the “free-to-use-advertising” business model and goes so far as to 
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352 Bea, see note 350 above.
353 For a full video interview of Kim Schmitz with New Zealand’s Broadcasting Campbell 
Live news program please see: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ZvrRaeHD5TE&feature=related> at 12 October 2012. Also, for the full interview 
transcript, please see: <http://www.daftpixel.com/2012/01/20/megauploadbust/> at 12 
October 2012.
354 Julian Harris, “The War Against On-line Piracy” (2011) 88 Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies Amicas Curae 1, 1. According to Harris, Megaupload.com has cost copyright owners 
more than USD$500 million worth of losses while at the same time has generated USD$175 
million of proceeds for its own investors and shareholders.
355 Sara Mishkin, “Dotcom Plans to Launch “Megaupload 2.0”, Financial Times Tech Hub 
(2012)  < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
fd9f8ab8-1396-11e2-9cc7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz295BAExxF> at 11 October 2012.
356 Stephanie Mlot, “Kim Dotcom Teases Upcoming Megabox Music Service”, PC 
Magazine (2012) <http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2410249,00.asp> at 11 October 
2012. According to Mlot, Megabox is already very appealing to users since it has already 
attracted a wide range of music sensations including popular bands and musicians such as 
Coldplay, Muse, Radiohead, Foo Fighters, David Bowie, Blur and Rihanna.pay musicians money even for music offered for free, owing to rentable advertising space 
available on individual musician’s profile pages. 
This novel approach to the way music is marketed and sold; directly from the creator to their 
audience via the Internet, is a fresh alternative to what Schmitz claims to be the “outdated 
monopolistic business model”357 of the RIAA. This echoes the sentiments of Professor 
Schumpeter who observed that “[e]very piece of business strategy acquires its true 
significance only against the background of process and within the situation created by it”.358 
This quote embodies the keys for success required in today’s modern Internet age very 
appropriately and emphasises this: there is no importance in how an industry struggles to 
protect its existing business model, but rather, how it adapts that model to the new conditions 
of its ever-fluctuating technological climate. And unless the RIAA or the MPAA can keep up 
with today’s Internet revolutionaries, then such industries will surely be left behind when the 
Internet and all its denizens reach the plateau of Internet singularity or what is to be the new 
“digital information commons”.
CONCLUSION
The key point of this paper is that the existence of proprietary rights over an intangible 
concept or idea is inherently problematic since it allows for the attachment of monetary 
value over something that by its very nature had none to begin with.359 As Karl Polanyi 
suggests, real property rights were merely reconceptualised so as to alter the notion of what 
property actually encompassed and was expanded to include the commodification of an 
intangible good.360 This process of “legal fictionalisation” occurred solely for the purpose of 
justifying the exchange of an intangible matter within a market for financial gain, and was 
neither concerned with its social production (how much labour and effort was actually 
expended in its creation), nor was it concerned about the freedom of access and 
dissemination of intellectual goods.
Consequently, control-critics are of the belief that intellectual goods should remain, as a 
natural right, within a public domain that is either free or at a low cost for all to access, 
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357 Please refer to full interview transcript available here: http://www.daftpixel.com/
2012/01/20/megauploadbust/ at 11 October 2012, at Part 1 paragraph 35.
358 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper Collins, 1975) 83 - 4.
359 May, see note 34 above, 124 - 5.
360 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time (Beacon Press, 2nd ed, 1957) 72ff.peruse and study. As eloquently put forth by Gary Flake in his presentation – entitled “How I 
learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Imminent Internet Singularity”361, human civilisation 
now possesses the technology and resources to recreate a monolithic online database of 
knowledge. A modern legendary library of Alexandria so to speak, containing every 
imaginable musical score, literary work or technological blueprint. If such a digital realm 
truly existed, it would undoubtedly spawn a wealth of creative thinking from any individual 
who engages and interacts with it. Though this has yet to come to pass, it is not so far-
fetched since the current world-wide-web seems to be unconsciously growing and gaining 
momentum toward this end.362
Intellectual property rights, however, threaten the realisation of this utopian dream. In March 
of 2011, the United States District Court ruled against Google’s continued attempts to create 
the world’s largest online library.363 Since early 2004, Google has commenced scanning and 
cataloging millions of books from various sources, including some of the world’s greatest 
libraries such as Oxford’s and Harvard’s University libraries.364 In his ratio decidendi, Chin J 
stated that “[w]hile the digitisation of books and the creation of a universal digital library 
would benefit many”, he added that Google had gone “too far” in its ambitious project to 
make the millions of scanned books accessible online through Google’s own eBooks365 
reading platform. And would “give [itself] a significant advantage over competitors, 
rewarding it for engaging in wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission”. 
This judicial reasoning reinforces the modern belief that the law and the judicial system is to 
uphold proprietary rights as being supremely sacred; far above any other notions of social 
welfare or benefit.366
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361 Gary Flake, “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Imminent Internet 
Singularity (speech delivered at Search Champs), transcript available here: <http://
castingwords.com/transcripts/O3/5073.html> at 7 September 2012.
362 Charles W. Bailey Jr, “Strong Copyright + DRM + Weak Net Neutrality = Digital 
Dystopia?” (2006) Information Technology and Libraries 116, 116.
363 Dominic Rushe, “US Judge Writes Unhappy Ending for Google’s Online Library Plans”, 
The Guardian (2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/23/google-online-
library-plans-thwarted> at 11 October 2011.
364 William Skidelsky, “Google’s plan for World’s Biggest Online Library: Philanthropy or 
Act of Piracy?” The Guardian (2009) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/aug/30/
google-library-project-books-settlement> at 11 October 2011.
365 Google’s ebook reading platform is still available here: <http://books.google.com/> at 11 
October 2012. It however does not allow the viewing of full content or entire books, rather it 
allows a limited preview, of up to 10% as allowed under current fair use exceptions.
366 Lessig 2, see note 169 above, 260.Looking back almost a century ago, in 1918, Brandeis J eloquently enshrined the baseline of 
where intellectual property laws should be drawn, or rather what kinds of information should 
not be subject to protection in order to give due deference to the basic human rights of 
liberty and free access.367 In International News Service v Associated Press, Brandeis J states 
that the general rule of law should never falter in upholding a person’s right to access “the 
noblest of human productions of information”, such as knowledge, ascertainable truths and 
ideas, which should be as “free as the air to common use”.368 And that the freedom to access 
such information should only be restricted in extreme situations where public policy 
demands it.369 By comparing the two judicial reasonings presented above, it would seem that 
human civilisation has regressed far beyond what Brandeis J envisioned.370 And humans now 
inhabit a world where the noblest of human productions are more commonly protected and 
barred from public access even where public policy demands it.371
Though this essay has painted a rather bleak landscape of the current global intellectual 
property climate, the Internet however does offers us a glimmer of hope for the survival of 
the free informational commons. In spite of the continual attempts to regulate and control it, 
the Internet will continue to thrive as a result of its neutrality, that is to say pirates and right-
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367 Benkler, see note 49 above, 354 - 5.
368 International News Service v Associated Press (1918) 248 U.S. 215, 250 per Brandeis J 
(Dissenting).
369 Ibid, at 251 per Brandeis J (Dissenting).
370 Benjamin Coriat and Fabienne Orsi, “Establishing a New Intellectual Property Rights 
Regime in the United States Origins, Contents and Problems” (2002) 31 Research Policy 
1491, 1491 - 2. In their paper, Coriat and Orsi state that intellectual property rights have been 
extended to include software patents, business models and living entities - all of which mark 
a relaxation of the patentability and protection criteria of intellectual property laws.
371 Also, another troubling modern encroachment into the realm of the informational 
commons, would be the extension of copyright laws over “mere compilations of facts”, or 
“mere expressions of truth” which could further stifle the dissemination of scientific fact and 
data. This position is prevalent in Australia, following the High Court case of IceTV Pty 
Limited v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 14 (appeal case) - which opined that 
if a plaintiff can demonstrate that sufficient skill and labour has gone into the factual 
compilation and if its reproduction is expressed in a similar manner, then the plaintiff can 
rightfully enforce their rights against the infringer through Australian copyright Laws. Also 
this legal principle has be codified in America via statute, see Collection of Information 
Antipiracy Act 1999 H.R.354 for the 106th Congress, s 2291.holders share the digital-space of the Internet concurrently as neighbours.372 Moreover, the 
Internet is structured in such a way that it is impossible to expect users to adhere linearly to a 
singular legitimate content source. In reality users engage in a blend of both activities; 
legitimate content purchasing and illegitimate file-sharing. Therefore, unless corporate 
entities respect this co-existence, then their repeated attempts at restricting users’ liberties 
will only encourage more users to embrace the liberatory potential that illicit alternatives 
offer.373 
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